THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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Introduction: The Problem of the Sociology of Knowledge

The basic contentions of the argument of this book are implicit in its title and subtitle, namely, that reality is socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes in which this occurs. The key terms in these contentions are "reality" and "knowledge," terms that are not only current in everyday speech, but that have behind them a long history of philosophical inquiry. We need not enter here into a discussion of the semantic intricacies of either the everyday or the philosophical usage of these terms. It will be enough, for our purposes, to define "reality" as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot "wish them away"), and to define "knowledge" as the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics. It is in this (admittedly simplistic) sense that the terms have relevance both to the man in the street and to the philosopher. The man in the street inhabits a world that is "real" to him, albeit in different degrees, and he "knows," with different degrees of confidence, that this world possesses such and such characteristics. The philosopher, of course, will raise questions about the ultimate status of both this "reality" and this "knowledge." *What is real? How is one to know?* These are among the most ancient questions not only of philosophical inquiry proper, but of human thought as such. Precisely for this reason the intrusion of the sociologist into this time-honored intellectual territory is likely to raise the eyebrows of the man in the street and even more likely to enrage the philosopher. It is, therefore, important that we clarify at the beginning the sense in which we use these terms in the context of sociology, and that we immediately disclaim any pretension to the effect that so-

ciology has an answer to these ancient philosophical preoccupations.

If we were going to be meticulous in the ensuing argument, we would put quotation marks around the two aforementioned terms every time we used them, but this would be stylistically awkward. To speak of quotation marks, however, may give a clue to the peculiar manner in which these terms appear in a sociological context. One could say that the sociological understanding of "reality" and "knowledge" falls somewhere in the middle between that of the man in the street and that of the philosopher. The man in the street does not ordinarily trouble himself about what is "real" to him and about what he "knows" unless he is stopped short by some sort of problem. He takes his "reality" and his "knowledge" for granted. The sociologist cannot do this, if only because of his systematic awareness of the fact that men in the street take quite different "realities" for granted as between one society and another. The sociologist is forced by the very logic of his discipline to ask, if nothing else, whether the difference between the two "realities" may not be understood in relation to various differences between the two societies. The philosopher, on the other hand, is professionally obligated to take nothing for granted, and to obtain maximal clarity as to the ultimate status of what the man in the street believes to be "reality" and "knowledge." Put differently, the philosopher is driven to decide where the quotation marks are in order and where they may safely be omitted, that is, to differentiate between valid and invalid assertions about the world. This the sociologist cannot possibly do. Logically, if not stylistically, he is stuck with the quotation marks.

For example, the man in the street may believe that he possesses "freedom of the will" and that he is therefore "responsible" for his actions, at the same time denying this "freedom" and this "responsibility" to infants and lunatics. The philosopher, by whatever methods, will inquire into the ontological and epistemological status of these conceptions. *Is man free? What is responsibility? Where are the limits of responsibility? How can one know these things?* And so on. Needless to say, the sociologist is in no position to supply

answers to these questions. What he can and must do, however, is to ask how it is that the notion of "freedom" has come to be taken for granted in one society and not in another, how its "reality" is maintained in the one society and how, even more interestingly, this "reality" may once again be lost to an individual or to an entire collectivity.

Sociological interest in questions of "reality" and "knowledge" is thus initially justified by the fact of their social relativity. What is "real" to a Tibetan monk may not be "real" to an American businessman. The "knowledge" of the criminal differs from the "knowledge" of the criminologist. It follows that specific agglomerations of "reality" and "knowledge" pertain to specific social contexts, and that these relationships will have to be included in an adequate sociological analysis of these contexts. The need for a "sociology of knowledge" is thus already given with the observable differences between societies in terms of what is taken for granted as "knowledge" in them. Beyond this, however, a discipline calling itself by this name will have to concern itself with the general ways by which "realities" are taken as "known" in human societies. In other words, a "sociology of knowledge" will have to deal not only with the empirical variety of "knowledge" in human societies, but also with the processes by which *any* body of "knowledge" comes to be socially established *as* "reality."

It is our contention, then, that the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with whatever passes for "knowledge" in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such "knowledge." And insofar as all human "knowledge" is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done in such a way that a taken-for-granted "reality" congeals for the man in the street. In other words, we contend that *the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality.*

This understanding of the proper field of the sociology of knowledge differs from what has generally been meant by this discipline since it was first so called some forty years ago. Before we begin our actual argument, therefore, it will be useful to look briefly at the previous development of the

discipline and to explicate in what way, and why, we have felt it necessary to deviate from it.

The term "sociology of knowledge" (*Wissenssoziologie*) was coined by Max Scheler.[1] The time was the 1920s, the place was Germany, and Scheler was a philosopher. These three facts are quite important for an understanding of the genesis and further development of the new discipline. The sociology of knowledge originated in a particular situation of German intellectual history and in a philosophical context. While the new discipline was subsequently introduced into the sociological context proper, particularly in the English-speaking world, it continued to be marked by the problems of the particular intellectual situation from which it arose. As a result the sociology of knowledge remained a peripheral concern among sociologists at large, who did not share the particular problems that troubled German thinkers in the 1920s. This was especially true of American sociologists, who have in the main looked upon the discipline as a marginal specialty with a persistent European flavor. More importantly, however, the continuing linkage of the sociology of knowledge with its original constellation of problems has been a theoretical weakness even where there has been an interest in the discipline. To wit, the sociology of knowledge has been looked upon, by its protagonists and by the more or less indifferent sociological public at large, as a sort of sociological gloss on the history of ideas. This has resulted in considerable myopia regarding the potential theoretical significance of the sociology of knowledge.

There have been different definitions of the nature and scope of the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, it might almost be said that the history of the subdiscipline thus far has been the history of its various definitions. Nevertheless, there has been general agreement to the effect that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises. It may thus be said that the sociology of knowledge constitutes the sociological focus of a much more general problem, that of the existential determination (*Seinsgebundenheit*) of thought as such. Although here the social factor is concentrated upon, the theoretical difficulties are similar to those

that have arisen when other factors (such as the historical, the psychological or the biological) have been proposed as determinative of human thought. In all these cases the general problem has been the extent to which thought reflects or is independent of the proposed determinative factors.

It is likely that the prominence of the general problem in recent German philosophy has its roots in the vast accumulation of historical scholarship that was one of the greatest intellectual fruits of the nineteenth century in Germany. In a way unparalleled in any other period of intellectual history the past, with all its amazing variety of forms of thought, was "made present" to the contemporary mind through the efforts of scientific historical scholarship. It is hard to dispute the claim of German scholarship to the primary position in this enterprise. It should, consequently, not surprise us that the theoretical problem thrown up by the latter should be most sharply sensed in Germany. This problem can be described as the vertigo of relativity. The epistemological dimension of the problem is obvious. On the empirical level it led to the concern to investigate as painstakingly as possible the concrete relationships between thought and its historical situations. If this interpretation is correct, the sociology of knowledge takes up a problem originally posited by historical scholarship—in a narrower focus, to be sure, but with an interest in essentially the same questions.[2]

Neither the general problem nor its narrower focus is new. An awareness of the social foundations of values and world views can be found in antiquity. At least as far back as the Enlightenment this awareness crystallized into a major theme of modern Western thought. It would thus be possible to make a good case for a number of "genealogies" for the central problem of the sociology of knowledge.[3] It may even be said that the problem is contained *in nuce* in Pascal's famous statement that what is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the other.[4] Yet the immediate intellectual antecedents of the sociology of knowledge are three developments in nineteenth-century German thought—the Marxian, the Nietzschean, and the historicist.

It is from Marx that the sociology of knowledge derived its root proposition—that man's consciousness is determined by

his social being.[5] To be sure, there has been much debate as to just what kind of determination Marx had in mind. It is safe to say that much of the great "struggle with Marx" that characterized not only the beginnings of the sociology of knowledge but the "classical age" of sociology in general (particularly as manifested in the works of Weber, Durkheim and Pareto) was really a struggle with a faulty interpretation of Marx by latter-day Marxists. This proposition gains plausibility when we reflect that it was only in 1932 that the very important *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* were rediscovered and only after World War II that the full implications of this rediscovery could be worked out in Marx research. Be this as it may, the sociology of knowledge inherited from Marx not only the sharpest formulation of its central problem but also some of its key concepts, among which should be mentioned particularly the concepts of "ideology" (ideas serving as weapons for social interests) and "false consciousness" (thought that is alienated from the real social being of the thinker).

The sociology of knowledge has been particularly fascinated by Marx's twin concepts of "substructure/superstructure" (*Unterbau/Ueberbau*). It is here particularly that controversy has raged about the correct interpretation of Marx's own thought. Later Marxism has tended to identify the "substructure" with economic structure *tcut court*, of which the "superstructure" was then supposed to be a direct "reflection" (thus Lenin, for instance). It is quite clear now that this misrepresents Marx's thought, as the essentially mechanistic rather than dialectical character of this kind of economic determinism should make one suspect. What concerned Marx was that human thought is founded in human activity ("labor," in the widest sense of the word) and in the social relations brought about by this activity. "Substructure" and "superstructure" are best understood if one views them as, respectively, human activity and the world produced by that activity.[6] In any case, the fundamental "sub/superstructure" scheme has been taken over in various forms by the sociology of knowledge, beginning with Scheler, always with an understanding that there is some sort of relationship between thought and an "underlying" reality other than thought. The

fascination of the scheme prevailed despite the fact that much of the sociology of knowledge was explicitly formulated in opposition to Marxism and that different positions have been taken within it regarding the nature of the relationship between the two components of the scheme.

Nietzschean ideas were less explicitly continued in the sociology of knowledge, but they belong very much to its general intellectual background and to the "mood" within which it arose. Nietzsche's anti-idealism, despite the differences in content not unlike Marx's in form, added additional perspectives on human thought as an instrument in the struggle for survival and power.[7] Nietzsche developed his own theory of "false consciousness" in his analyses of the social significance of deception and self-deception, and of illusion as a necessary condition of life. Nietzsche's concept of "resentment" as a generative factor for certain types of human thought was taken over directly by Scheler. Most generally, though, one can say that the sociology of knowledge represents a specific application of what Nietzsche aptly called the "art of mistrust."[8]

Historicism, especially as expressed in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, immediately preceded the sociology of knowledge.[9] The dominant theme here was an overwhelming sense of the relativity of all perspectives on human events, that is, of the inevitable historicity of human thought. The historicist insistence that no historical situation could be understood except in its own terms could readily be translated into an emphasis on the social situation of thought. Certain historicist concepts, such as "situational determination" (*Standortsgebundenheit*) and "seat in life" (*Sitz im Leben*) could be directly translated as referring to the "social location" of thought. More generally, the historicist heritage of the sociology of knowledge predisposed the latter toward a strong interest in history and the employment of an essentially historical method—a fact, incidentally, that also made for its marginality in the milieu of American sociology.

Scheler's interest in the sociology of knowledge, and in sociological questions generally, was essentially a passing episode during his philosophical career.[10] His final aim was the establishment of a philosophical anthropology that would

transcend the relativity of specific historically and socially located viewpoints. The sociology of knowledge was to serve as an instrument toward this aim, its main purpose being the clearing away of the difficulties raised by relativism so that the real philosophical task could proceed. Scheler's sociology of knowledge is, in a very real sense, *ancilla philosophiae*, and of a very specific philosophy to boot.

In line with this orientation, Scheler's sociology of knowledge is essentially a negative method. Scheler argued that the relationship between "ideal factors" (*Idealfaktoren*) and "real factors" (*Realfaktoren*), terms that are clearly reminiscent of the Marxian "sub/superstructure" scheme, was merely a regulative one. That is, the "real factors" regulate the conditions under which certain "ideal factors" can appear in history, but cannot affect the content of the latter. In other words, society determines the presence (*Dasein*) but not the nature (*Sosein*) of ideas. The sociology of knowledge, then, is the procedure by which the socio-historical selection of ideational contents is to be studied, it being understood that the contents themselves are independent of socio-historical causation and thus inaccessible to sociological analysis. If one may describe Scheler's method graphically, it is to throw a sizable sop to the dragon of relativity, but only so as to enter the castle of ontological certitude better.

Within this intentionally (and inevitably) modest framework Scheler analyzed in considerable detail the manner in which human knowledge is ordered by society. He emphasized that human knowledge is given in society as an *a priori* to individual experience, providing the latter with its order of meaning. This order, although it is relative to a particular socio-historical situation, appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world. Scheler called this the "relative-natural world view" (*relativnatürliche Weltanschauung*) of a society, a concept that may still be regarded as central for the sociology of knowledge.

Following Scheler's "invention" of the sociology of knowledge, there was extensive debate in Germany concerning the validity, scope and applicability of the new discipline.[11] Out of this debate emerged one formulation that marked the transposition of the sociology of knowledge into a more nar-

rowly sociological context. The same formulation was the one in which the sociology of knowledge arrived in the English-speaking world. This is the formulation by Karl Mannheim.[12] It is safe to say when sociologists today think of the sociology of knowledge, *pro* or *con*, they usually do so in terms of Mannheim's formulation of it. In American sociology this is readily intelligible if one reflects on the accessibility in English of virtually the whole of Mannheim's work (some of which, indeed, was written in English, during the period Mannheim was teaching in England after the advent of Nazism in Germany, or was brought out in revised English versions), while Scheler's work in the sociology of knowledge has remained untranslated to date. Apart from this "diffusion" factor, Mannheim's work is less burdened with philosophical "baggage" than Scheler's. This is especially true of Mannheim's later writings and can be seen if one compares the English version of his main work, *Ideology and Utopia*, with its German original. Mannheim thus became the more "congenial" figure for sociologists, even those critical of or not very interested in his approach.

Mannheim's understanding of the sociology of knowledge was much more far-reaching than Scheler's, possibly because the confrontation with Marxism was more prominent in his work. Society was here seen as determining not only the appearance but also the content of human ideation, with the exception of mathematics and at least parts of the natural sciences. The sociology of knowledge thus became a positive method for the study of almost any facet of human thought.

Significantly, Mannheim's key concern was with the phenomenon of ideology. He distinguished between the particular, the total, and the general concepts of ideology—ideology as constituting only a segment of an opponent's thought; ideology as constituting the whole of an opponent's thought (similar to Marx's "false consciousness"); and (here, as Mannheim thought, going beyond Marx) ideology as characteristic not only of an opponent's but of one's own thought as well. With the general concept of ideology the level of the sociology of knowledge is reached—the understanding that no human thought (with only the afore-mentioned exceptions) is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context.

By this expansion of the theory of ideology Mannheim sought to abstract its central problem from the context of political usage, and to treat it as a general problem of epistemology and historical sociology.

Although Mannheim did not share Scheler's ontological ambitions, he too was uncomfortable with the pan-ideologism into which his thinking seemed to lead him. He coined the term "relationism" (in contradistinction to "relativism") to denote the epistemological perspective of his sociology of knowledge—not a capitulation of thought before the socio-historical relativities, but a sober recognition that knowledge must always be knowledge from a certain position. The influence of Dilthey is probably of great importance at this point in Mannheim's thought—the problem of Marxism is solved by the tools of historicism. Be this as it may, Mannheim believed that ideologizing influences, while they could not be eradicated completely, could be mitigated by the systematic analysis of as many as possible of the varying socially grounded positions. In other words, the object of thought becomes progressively clearer with this accumulation of different perspectives on it. This is to be the task of the sociology of knowledge, which thus is to become an important aid in the quest for any correct understanding of human events.

Mannheim believed that different social groups vary greatly in their capacity thus to transcend their own narrow position. He placed his major hope in the "socially unattached intelligentsia" (*freischwebende Intelligenz*, a term derived from Alfred Weber), a sort of interstitial stratum that he believed to be relatively free of class interests. Mannheim also stressed the power of "utopian" thought, which (like ideology) produces a distorted image of social reality, but which (unlike ideology) has the dynamism to transform that reality into its image of it.

Needless to say, the above remarks can in no way do justice to either Scheler's or Mannheim's conception of the sociology of knowledge. This is not our intention here. We have merely indicated some key features of the two conceptions, which have been aptly called, respectively, the "moderate" and "radical" conceptions of the sociology of knowledge.[13] What is remarkable is that the subsequent development of the so-

ciology of knowledge has, to a large extent, consisted of critiques and modifications of these two conceptions. As we have already pointed out, Mannheim's formulation of the sociology of knowledge has continued to set the terms of reference for the discipline in a definitive manner, particularly in English-speaking sociology.

The most important American sociologist to have paid serious attention to the sociology of knowledge has been Robert Merton.[14] His discussion of the discipline, which covers two chapters of his major work, has served as a useful introduction to the field for such American sociologists as have been interested in it. Merton constructed a paradigm for the sociology of knowledge, restating its major themes in a compressed and coherent form. This construction is interesting because it seeks to integrate the approach of the sociology of knowledge with that of structural-functional theory. Merton's own concepts of "manifest" and "latent" functions are applied to the sphere of ideation, the distinction being made between the intended, conscious functions of ideas, and the unintended, unconscious ones. While Merton concentrated on the work of Mannheim, who was for him the sociologist of knowledge par excellence, he stressed the significance of the Durkheim school and of the work of Pitirim Sorokin. It is interesting that Merton apparently failed to see the relevance to the sociology of knowledge of certain important developments in American social psychology, such as reference-group theory, which he discusses in a different part of the same work.

Talcott Parsons has also commented on the sociology of knowledge.[15] This comment, however, is limited mainly to a critique of Mannheim and does not seek an integration of the discipline within Parsons' own theoretical system. In the latter, to be sure, the "problem of the role of ideas" is analyzed at length, but in a frame of reference quite different from that of either Scheler's or Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.[16] We would, therefore, venture to say that neither Merton nor Parsons has gone in any decisive way beyond the sociology of knowledge as formulated by Mannheim. The same can be said of their critics. To mention only the most vocal one, C. Wright Mills dealt with the sociology of knowl-

edge in his earlier writing, but in an expositional manner and without contributing to its theoretical development.[17]

An interesting effort to integrate the sociology of knowledge with a neo-positivist approach to sociology in general is that of Theodor Geiger, who had a great influence on Scandinavian sociology after his emigration from Germany.[18] Geiger returned to a narrower concept of ideology as socially distorted thought and maintained the possibility of overcoming ideology by careful adherence to scientific canons of procedure. The neo-positivist approach to idéological analysis has more recently been continued in German-speaking sociology in the work of Ernst Topitsch, who has emphasized the ideological roots of various philosophical positions.[19] Insofar as the sociological analysis of ideologies constitutes an important part of the sociology of knowledge as defined by Mannheim, there has been a good deal of interest in it in both European and American sociology since World War II.[20]

Probably the most far-reaching attempt to go beyond Mannheim in the construction of a comprehensive sociology of knowledge is that of Werner Stark, another émigré continental scholar who has taught in England and the United States.[21] Stark goes farthest in leaving behind Mannheim's focus on the problem of ideology. The task of the sociology of knowledge is not to be the debunking or uncovering of socially produced distortions, but the systematic study of the social conditions of knowledge as such. Put simply, the central problem is the sociology of truth, not the sociology of error. Despite his distinctive approach, Stark is probably closer to Scheler than to Mannheim in his understanding of the relationship between ideas and their social context.

Again, it is obvious that we have not tried to give an adequate historical overview of the history of the sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, we have so far ignored developments that might theoretically be relevant to the sociology of knowledge but that have not been so considered by their own protagonists. In other words, we have limited ourselves to developments that, so to speak, sailed under the banner "sociology of knowledge" (considering the theory of ideology to be a part of the latter). This has made one fact very clear. Apart from the epistemological concern of some sociologists

of knowledge, the empirical focus of attention has been almost exclusively on the sphere of ideas, that is, of theoretical thought. This is also true of Stark, who subtitled his major work on the sociology of knowledge "An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas." In other words, the interest of the sociology of knowledge has been on epistemological questions on the theoretical level, on questions of intellectual history on the empirical level.

We would emphasize that we have no reservations whatsoever about the validity and importance of these two sets of questions. However, we regard it as unfortunate that this particular constellation has dominated the sociology of knowledge so far. We would argue that, as a result, the full theoretical significance of the sociology of knowledge has been obscured.

To include epistemological questions concerning the validity of sociological knowledge in the sociology of knowledge is somewhat like trying to push a bus in which one is riding. To be sure, the sociology of knowledge, like all empirical disciplines that accumulate evidence concerning the relativity and determination of human thought, leads toward epistemological questions concerning sociology itself as well as any other scientific body of knowledge. As we have remarked before, in this the sociology of knowledge plays a part similar to history, psychology, and biology, to mention only the three most important empirical disciplines that have caused trouble for epistemology. The logical structure of this trouble is basically the same in all cases: How can I be sure, say, of my sociological analysis of American middle-class mores in view of the fact that the categories I use for this analysis are conditioned by historically relative forms of thought, that I myself and everything I think is determined by my genes and by my ingrown hostility to my fellowmen, and that, to cap it all, I am myself a member of the American middle class?

Far be it from us to brush aside such questions. All we would contend here is that these questions are not themselves part of the empirical discipline of sociology. They properly belong to the methodology of the social sciences, an enterprise that belongs to philosophy and is by definition other than sociology, which is indeed an object of its inquiries.

The sociology of knowledge, along with the other epistemological troublemakers among the empirical sciences, will "feed" problems to this methodological inquiry. It cannot solve these problems within its own proper frame of reference.

We therefore exclude from the sociology of knowledge the epistemological and methodological problems that bothered both of its major originators. By virtue of this exclusion we are setting ourselves apart from both Scheler's and Mannheim's conception of the discipline, and from the later sociologists of knowledge (notably those with a neo-positivist orientation) who shared the conception in this respect. Throughout the present work we have firmly bracketed any epistemological or methodological questions about the validity of sociological analysis, in the sociology of knowledge itself or in any other area. We consider the sociology of knowledge to be part of the empirical discipline of sociology. Our purpose here is, of course, a theoretical one. But our theorizing refers to the empirical discipline in its concrete problems, not to the philosophical investigation of the foundations of the empirical discipline. In sum, our enterprise is one of sociological theory, *not* of the methodology of sociology. Only in one section of our treatise (the one immediately following this introduction) do we go beyond sociological theory proper, but this is done for reasons that have little to do with epistemology, as will be explained at the time.

We must also, however, redefine the task of the sociology of knowledge on the empirical level, that is, as theory geared to the empirical discipline of sociology. As we have seen, on this level the sociology of knowledge has been concerned with intellectual history, in the sense of the history of ideas. Again, we would stress that this is, indeed, a very important focus of sociological inquiry. Furthermore, in contrast with our exclusion of the epistemological/methodological problem, we concede that this focus belongs with the sociology of knowledge. We would argue, however, that the problem of "ideas," including the special problem of ideology, constitutes only part of the larger problem of the sociology of knowledge, and not a central part at that.

The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with every-

thing that passes for "knowledge" in society. As soon as one states this, one realizes that the focus on intellectual history is ill-chosen, or rather, is ill-chosen if it becomes the central focus of the sociology of knowledge. Theoretical thought, "ideas," *Weltanschauungen* are not *that* important in society. Although every society contains these phenomena, they are only part of the sum of what passes for "knowledge." Only a very limited group of people in any society engages in theorizing, in the business of "ideas," and the construction of *Weltanschauungen.* But everyone in society participates in its "knowledge" in one way or another. Put differently, only a few are concerned with the theoretical interpretation of the world, but everybody lives in a world of some sort. Not only is the focus on theoretical thought unduly restrictive for the sociology of knowledge, it is also unsatisfactory because even this part of socially available "knowledge" cannot be fully understood if it is not placed in the framework of a more general analysis of "knowledge."

To exaggerate the importance of theoretical thought in society and history is a natural failing of theorizers. It is then all the more necessary to correct this intellectualistic misapprehension. The theoretical formulations of reality, whether they be scientific or philosophical or even mythological, do not exhaust what is "real" for the members of a society. Since this is so, the sociology of knowledge must first of all concern itself with what people "know" as "reality" in their everyday, non- or pre-theoretical lives. In other words, commonsense "knowledge" rather than "ideas" must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge. It is precisely this "knowledge" that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist.

The sociology of knowledge, therefore, must concern itself with the social construction of reality. The analysis of the theoretical articulation of this reality will certainly continue to be a part of this concern, but not the most important part. It will be clear that, despite the exclusion of the epistemological/methodological problem, what we are suggesting here is a far-reaching redefinition of the scope of the sociology of knowledge, much wider than what has hitherto been understood as this discipline.

The question arises as to what theoretical ingredients ought to be added to the sociology of knowledge to permit its redefinition in the above sense. We owe the fundamental insight into the necessity for this redefinition to Alfred Schutz. Throughout his work, both as philosopher and as sociologist, Schutz concentrated on the structure of the commonsense world of everyday life. Although he himself did not elaborate a sociology of knowledge, he clearly saw what this discipline would have to focus on:

All typifications of common-sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete historical sociocultural *Lebenswelt* within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially approved. Their structure determines among other things the social distribution of knowledge and its relativity and relevance to the concrete social environment of a concrete group in a concrete historical situation. *Here are the legitimate problems of relativism, historicism, and of the so-called sociology of knowledge.*[22]

And again:

Knowledge is socially distributed and the mechanism of this distribution can be made the subject matter of a sociological discipline. True, we have a so-called sociology of knowledge. Yet, with very few exceptions, the discipline thus misnamed has approached the problem of the social distribution of knowledge merely from the angle of the ideological foundation of truth in its dependence upon social and, especially, economic conditions, or from that of the social implications of education, or that of the social role of the man of knowledge. Not sociologists but economists and philosophers have studied some of the many other theoretical aspects of the problem.[23]

While we would not give the central place to the social distribution of knowledge that Schutz implies here, we agree with his criticism of "the discipline thus misnamed" and have derived from him our basic notion of the manner in which the task of the sociology of knowledge must be redefined. In

the following considerations we are heavily dependent on Schutz in the prolegomena concerning the foundations of knowledge in everyday life and greatly indebted to his work in various important places of our main argument thereafter.

Our anthropological presuppositions are strongly influenced by Marx, especially his early writings, and by the anthropological implications drawn from human biology by Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen and others. Our view of the nature of social reality is greatly indebted to Durkheim and his school in French sociology, though we have modified the Durkheimian theory of society by the introduction of a dialectical perspective derived from Marx and an emphasis on the constitution of social reality through subjective meanings derived from Weber.[24] Our social-psychological presuppositions, especially important for the analysis of the internalization of social reality, are greatly influenced by George Herbert Mead and some developments of his work by the so-called symbolic-interactionist school of American sociology.[25] We shall indicate in the footnotes how these various ingredients are used in our theoretical formation. We fully realize, of course, that in this use we are not and cannot be faithful to the original intentions of these several streams of social theory themselves. But, as we have already stated, our purpose here is not exegetical, nor even synthesis for the sake of synthesis. We are fully aware that, in various places, we do violence to certain thinkers by integrating their thought into a theoretical formation that some of them might have found quite alien. We would say in justification that historical gratitude is not in itself a scientific virtue. We may cite here some remarks by Talcott Parsons (about whose theory we have serious misgivings, but whose integrative intention we fully share):

> The primary aim of the study is not to determine and state in summary form what these writers said or believed about the subjects they wrote about. Nor is it to inquire directly with reference to each proposition of their "theories" whether what they have said is tenable in the light of present sociological and related knowledge. . . . It is a study in social *theory*, not *theories*. Its

interest is not in the separate and discrete propositions to be found in the works of these men, but in a *single* body of systematic theoretical reasoning.[26]

Our purpose, indeed, is to engage in "systematic theoretical reasoning."

It will already be evident that our redefinition of its nature and scope would move the sociology of knowledge from the periphery to the very center of sociological theory. We may assure the reader that we have no vested interest in the label "sociology of knowledge." It is rather our understanding of sociological theory that led us to the sociology of knowledge and guided the manner in which we were to redefine its problems and tasks. We can best describe the path along which we set out by reference to two of the most famous and most influential "marching orders" for sociology.

One was given by Durkheim in *The Rules of Sociological Method*, the other by Weber in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Durkheim tells us: "The first and most fundamental rule is: *Consider social facts as things*."[27] And Weber observes: "Both for sociology in the present sense, and for history, the object of cognition is the subjective meaning-complex of action."[28] These two statements are not contradictory. Society does indeed possess objective facticity. And society is indeed built up by activity that expresses subjective meaning. And, incidentally, Durkheim knew the latter, just as Weber knew the former. It is precisely the dual character of society in terms of objective facticity *and* subjective meaning that makes its "reality *sui generis*," to use another key term of Durkheim's. The central question for sociological theory can then be put as follows: How is it possible that subjective meanings *become* objective facticities? Or, in terms appropriate to the afore-mentioned theoretical positions: How is it possible that human activity (*Handeln*) should produce a world of things (*choses*)? In other words, an adequate understanding of the "reality *sui generis*" of society requires an inquiry into the manner in which this reality is constructed. This inquiry, we maintain, is the task of the sociology of knowledge.

I. The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life

1. THE REALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Since our purpose in this treatise is a sociological analysis of the reality of everyday life, more precisely, of knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life, and we are only tangentially interested in how this reality may appear in various theoretical perspectives to intellectuals, we must begin by a clarification of that reality as it is available to the common-sense of the ordinary members of society. How that common-sense reality may be influenced by the theoretical constructions of intellectuals and other merchants of ideas is a further question. Ours is thus an enterprise that, although theoretical in character, is geared to the understanding of a reality that forms the subject matter of the empirical science of sociology, that is, the world of everyday life.

It should be evident, then, that our purpose is not to engage in philosophy. All the same, if the reality of everyday life is to be understood, account must be taken of its intrinsic character before we can proceed with sociological analysis proper. Everyday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world. As sociologists we take this reality as the object of our analyses. Within the frame of reference of sociology as an empirical science it is possible to take this reality as given, to take as data particular phenomena arising within it, without further inquiring about the foundations of this reality, which is a philosophical task. However, given the particular purpose of the present treatise, we cannot completely bypass the philosophical problem. The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their

lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. Before turning to our main task we must, therefore, attempt to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life, to wit, the objectivations of subjective processes (and meanings) by which the intersubjective commonsense world is constructed.

For the purpose at hand, this is a preliminary task, and we can do no more than sketch the main features of what we believe to be an adequate solution to the philosophical problem —adequate, let us hasten to add, only in the sense that it can serve as a starting point for sociological analysis. The considerations immediately following are, therefore, of the nature of philosophical prolegomena and, in themselves, pre-sociological. The method we consider best suited to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life is that of phenomenological analysis, a purely descriptive method and, as such, "empirical" but not "scientific"—as we understand the nature of the empirical sciences.[1]

The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analyzed. It is important to remember this. Commonsense contains innumerable pre- and quasi-scientific interpretations about everyday reality, which it takes for granted. If we are to describe the reality of commonsense we must refer to these interpretations, just as we must take account of its taken-for-granted character—but we do so within phenomenological brackets.

Consciousness is always intentional; it always intends or is directed toward objects. We can never apprehend some putative substratum of consciousness as such, only consciousness of something or other. This is so regardless of whether the object of consciousness is experienced as belonging to an external physical world or apprehended as an element of an inward subjective reality. Whether I (the first person singular, here as in the following illustrations, standing for ordinary self-consciousness in everyday life) am viewing the panorama of New York City or whether I become conscious of an inner anxiety, the processes of consciousness involved are intentional in both instances. The point need not be bela-

bored that the consciousness of the Empire State Building differs from the awareness of anxiety. A detailed phenomeno- logical analysis would uncover the various layers of experi- ence, and the different structures of meaning involved in, say, being bitten by a dog, remembering having been bitten by a dog, having a phobia about all dogs, and so forth. What in- terests us here is the common intentional character of all consciousness.

Different objects present themselves to consciousness as constituents of different spheres of reality. I recognize the fellowmen I must deal with in the course of everyday life as pertaining to a reality quite different from the disembodied figures that appear in my dreams. The two sets of objects introduce quite different tensions into my consciousness and I am attentive to them in quite different ways. My conscious- ness, then, is capable of moving through different spheres of reality. Put differently, I am conscious of the world as con- sisting of multiple realities. As I move from one reality to another, I experience the transition as a kind of shock. This shock is to be understood as caused by the shift in attentive- ness that the transition entails. Waking up from a dream il- lustrates this shift most simply.

Among the multiple realities there is one that presents it- self as the reality par excellence. This is the reality of every- day life. Its privileged position entitles it to the designation of paramount reality. The tension of consciousness is highest in everyday life, that is, the latter imposes itself upon con- sciousness in the most massive, urgent and intense manner. It is impossible to ignore, difficult even to weaken in its im- perative presence. Consequently, it forces me to be attentive to it in the fullest way. I experience everyday life in the state of being wide-awake. This wide-awake state of existing in and apprehending the reality of everyday life is taken by me to be normal and self-evident, that is, it constitutes my natural attitude.

I apprehend the reality of everyday life as an ordered real- ity. Its phenomena are prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of my apprehension of them and that impose themselves upon the latter. The reality of everyday life ap- pears already objectified, that is, constituted by an order of

objects that have been designated *as* objects before my appearance on the scene. The language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me. I live in a place that is geographically designated; I employ tools, from can openers to sports cars, which are designated in the technical vocabulary of my society; I live within a web of human relationships, from my chess club to the United States of America, which are also ordered by means of vocabulary. In this manner language marks the co-ordinates of my life in society and fills that life with meaningful objects.

The reality of everyday life is organized around the "here" of my body and the "now" of my present. This "here and now" is the focus of my attention to the reality of everyday life. What is "here and now" presented to me in everyday life is the *realissimum* of my consciousness. The reality of everyday life is not, however, exhausted by these immediate presences, but embraces phenomena that are not present "here and now." This means that I experience everyday life in terms of differing degrees of closeness and remoteness, both spatially and temporally. Closest to me is the zone of everyday life that is directly accessible to my bodily manipulation. This zone contains the world within my reach, the world in which I act so as to modify its reality, or the world in which I work. In this world of working my consciousness is dominated by the pragmatic motive, that is, my attention to this world is mainly determined by what I am doing, have done or plan to do in it. In this way it is *my* world par excellence. I know, of course, that the reality of everyday life contains zones that are not accessible to me in this manner. But either I have no pragmatic interest in these zones or my interest in them is indirect insofar as they may be, potentially, manipulative zones for me. Typically, my interest in the far zones is less intense and certainly less urgent. I am intensely interested in the cluster of objects involved in my daily occupation—say, the world of the garage, if I am a mechanic. I am interested, though less directly, in what goes on in the testing laboratories of the automobile industry in Detroit—I am unlikely ever to be in one of these laboratories, but the

work done there will eventually affect my everyday life. I may also be interested in what goes on at Cape Kennedy or in outer space, but this interest is a matter of private, "leisure-time" choice rather than an urgent necessity of my everyday life.

The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective world, a world that I share with others. This intersubjectivity sharply differentiates everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I am alone in the world of my dreams, but I know that the world of everyday life is as real to others as it is to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others. I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications by which this world is ordered, that they also organize this world around the "here and now" of *their* being in it and have projects for working in it. I also know, of course, that the others have a perspective on this common world that is not identical with mine. My "here" is their "there." My "now" does not fully overlap with theirs. My projects differ from and may even conflict with theirs. All the same, I know that I live with them in a common world. Most importantly, I know that there is an ongoing correspondence between *my* meanings and *their* meanings in this world, that we share a common sense about its reality. The natural attitude is the attitude of commonsense consciousness precisely because it refers to a world that is common to many men. Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge I share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life.

The reality of everyday life is taken for granted *as* reality. It does not require additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply *there*, as self-evident and compelling facticity. I *know* that it is real. While I am capable of engaging in doubt about its reality, I am obliged to suspend such doubt as I routinely exist in everyday life. This suspension of doubt is so firm that to abandon it, as I might want to do, say, in theoretical or religious contemplation, I have to make an extreme transition. The world of everyday life proclaims itself and, when I want to challenge the procla-

mation, I must engage in a deliberate, by no means easy effort. The transition from the natural attitude to the theoretical attitude of the philosopher or scientist illustrates this point. But not all aspects of this reality are equally unproblematic. Everyday life is divided into sectors that are apprehended routinely, and others that present me with problems of one kind or another. Suppose that I am an automobile mechanic who is highly knowledgeable about all American-made cars. Everything that pertains to the latter is a routine, unproblematic facet of my everyday life. But one day someone appears in the garage and asks me to repair his Volkswagen. I am now compelled to enter the problematic world of foreign-made cars. I may do so reluctantly or with professional curiosity, but in either case I am now faced with problems that I have not yet routinized. At the same time, of course, I do not leave the reality of everyday life. Indeed, the latter becomes enriched as I begin to incorporate into it the knowledge and skills required for the repair of foreign-made cars. The reality of everyday life encompasses both kinds of sectors, as long as what appears as a problem does not pertain to a different reality altogether (say, the reality of theoretical physics, or of nightmares). As long as the routines of everyday life continue without interruption they are apprehended as unproblematic.

But even the unproblematic sector of everyday reality is so only until further notice, that is, until its continuity is interrupted by the appearance of a problem. When this happens, the reality of everyday life seeks to integrate the problematic sector into what is already unproblematic. Commonsense knowledge contains a variety of instructions as to how this is to be done. For instance, the others with whom I work are unproblematic to me as long as they perform their familiar, taken-for-granted routines—say, typing away at desks next to mine in my office. They become problematic if they interrupt these routines—say, huddling together in a corner and talking in whispers. As I inquire about the meaning of this unusual activity, there is a variety of possibilities that my common-sense knowledge is capable of reintegrating into the unproblematic routines of everyday life: they may be consulting on how to fix a broken typewriter, or one of them may have

some urgent instructions from the boss, and so on. On the other hand, I may find that they are discussing a union directive to go on strike, something as yet outside my experience but still well within the range of problems with which my commonsense knowledge can deal. It will deal with it, though, *as* a problem, rather than simply reintegrating it into the unproblematic sector of everyday life. If, however, I come to the conclusion that my colleagues have gone collectively mad, the problem that presents itself is of yet another kind. I am now faced with a problem that transcends the boundaries of the reality of everyday life and points to an altogether different reality. Indeed, my conclusion that my colleagues have gone mad implies *ipso facto* that they have gone off into a world that is no longer the common world of everyday life.

Compared to the reality of everyday life, other realities appear as finite provinces of meaning, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribed meanings and modes of experience. The paramount reality envelops them on all sides, as it were, and consciousness always returns to the paramount reality as from an excursion. This is evident from the illustrations already given, as in the reality of dreams or that of theoretical thought. Similar "commutations" take place between the world of everyday life and the world of play, both the playing of children and, even more sharply, of adults. The theater provides an excellent illustration of such playing on the part of adults. The transition between realities is marked by the rising and falling of the curtain. As the curtain rises, the spectator is "transported to another world," with its own meanings and an order that may or may not have much to do with the order of everyday life. As the curtain falls, the spectator "returns to reality," that is, to the paramount reality of everyday life by comparison with which the reality presented on the stage now appears tenuous and ephemeral, however vivid the presentation may have been a few moments previously. Aesthetic and religious experience is rich in producing transitions of this kind, inasmuch as art and religion are endemic producers of finite provinces of meaning.

All finite provinces of meaning are characterized by a turning away of attention from the reality of everyday life. While

there are, of course, shifts in attention *within* everyday life, the shift to a finite province of meaning is of a much more radical kind. A radical change takes place in the tension of consciousness. In the context of religious experience this has been aptly called "leaping." It is important to stress, however, that the reality of everyday life retains its paramount status even as such "leaps" take place. If nothing else, language makes sure of this. The common language available to me for the objectification of my experiences is grounded in everyday life and keeps pointing back to it even as I employ it to interpret experiences in finite provinces of meaning. Typically, therefore, I "distort" the reality of the latter as soon as I begin to use the common language in interpreting them, that is, I "translate" the non-everyday experiences back into the paramount reality of everyday life. This may be readily seen in terms of dreams, but is also typical of those trying to report about theoretical, aesthetic or religious worlds of meaning. The theoretical physicist tells us that his concept of space cannot be conveyed linguistically, just as the artist does with regard to the meaning of his creations and the mystic with regard to his encounters with the divine. Yet all these—dreamer, physicist, artist and mystic—*also* live in the reality of everyday life. Indeed, one of their important problems is to interpret the coexistence of this reality with the reality enclaves into which they have ventured.

The world of everyday life is structured both spatially and temporally. The spatial structure is quite peripheral to our present considerations. Suffice it to point out that it, too, has a social dimension by virtue of the fact that my manipulatory zone intersects with that of others. More important for our present purpose is the temporal structure of everyday life.

Temporality is an intrinsic property of consciousness. The stream of consciousness is always ordered temporally. It is possible to differentiate between different levels of this temporality as it is intrasubjectively available. Every individual is conscious of an inner flow of time, which in turn is founded on the physiological rhythms of the organism though it is not identical with these. It would greatly exceed the scope of these prolegomena to enter into a detailed analysis of these levels of intrasubjective temporality. As we have indicated,

however, intersubjectivity in everyday life also has a temporal dimension. The world of everyday life has its own standard time, which is intersubjectively available. This standard time may be understood as the intersection between cosmic time and its socially established calendar, based on the temporal sequences of nature, and inner time, in its aforementioned differentiations. There can never be full simultaneity between these various levels of temporality, as the experience of waiting indicates most clearly. Both my organism and my society impose upon me, and upon my inner time, certain sequences of events that involve waiting. I may want to take part in a sports event, but I must wait for my bruised knee to heal. Or again, I must wait until certain papers are processed so that my qualification for the event may be officially established. It may readily be seen that the temporal structure of everyday life is exceedingly complex, because the different levels of empirically present temporality must be ongoingly correlated.

The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as continuous and finite. All my existence in this world is continuously ordered by its time, is indeed enveloped by it. My own life is an episode in the externally factitious stream of time. It was there before I was born and it will be there after I die. The knowledge of my inevitable death makes this time finite *for me*. I have only a certain amount of time available for the realization of my projects, and the knowledge of this affects my attitude to these projects. Also, since I do not want to die, this knowledge injects an underlying anxiety into my projects. Thus I cannot endlessly repeat my participation in sports events. I know that I am getting older. It may even be that this is the last occasion on which I have the chance to participate. My waiting will be anxious to the degree in which the finitude of time impinges upon the project.

The same temporal structure, as has already been indicated, is coercive. I cannot reverse at will the sequences imposed by it—"first things first" is an essential element of my knowledge of everyday life. Thus I cannot take a certain

examination before I have passed through certain educational programs, I cannot practice my profession before I have taken this examination, and so on. Also, the same temporal structure provides the historicity that determines my situation in the world of everyday life. I was born on a certain date, entered school on another, started working as a professional on another, and so on. These dates, however, are all "located" within a much more comprehensive history, and this "location" decisively shapes my situation. Thus I was born in the year of the great bank crash in which my father lost his wealth, I entered school just before the revolution, I began to work just after the great war broke out, and so forth. The temporal structure of everyday life not only imposes prearranged sequences upon the "agenda" of any single day but also imposes itself upon my biography as a whole. Within the co-ordinates set by this temporal structure I apprehend both daily "agenda" and overall biography. Clock and calendar ensure that, indeed, I am a "man of my time." Only within this temporal structure does everyday life retain for me its accent of reality. Thus in cases where I may be "disoriented" for one reason or another (say, I have been in an automobile accident in which I was knocked unconscious), I feel an almost instinctive urge to "reorient" myself within the temporal structure of everyday life. I look at my watch and try to recall what day it is. By these acts alone I re-enter the reality of everyday life.

2. SOCIAL INTERACTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE

The reality of everyday life is shared with others. But how are these others themselves experienced in everyday life? Again, it is possible to differentiate between several modes of such experience.

The most important experience of others takes place in the face-to-face situation, which is the prototypical case of social interaction. All other cases are derivatives of it.

In the face-to-face situation the other is appresented to me in a vivid present shared by both of us. I know that in the same vivid present I am appresented to him. My and his

"here and now" continuously impinge on each other as long as the face-to-face situation continues. As a result, there is a continuous interchange of my expressivity and his. I see him smile, then react to my frown by stopping the smile, then smiling again as I smile, and so on. Every expression of mine is oriented toward him, and vice versa, and this continuous reciprocity of expressive acts is simultaneously available to both of us. This means that, in the face-to-face situation, the other's subjectivity is available to me through a maximum of symptoms. To be sure, I may misinterpret some of these symptoms. I may think that the other is smiling while in fact he is smirking. Nevertheless, no other form of social relating can reproduce the plenitude of symptoms of subjectivity present in the face-to-face situation. Only here is the other's subjectivity emphatically "close." All other forms of relating to the other are, in varying degrees, "remote."

In the face-to-face situation the other is fully real. This reality is part of the overall reality of everyday life, and as such massive and compelling. To be sure, another may be real to me without my having encountered him face to face —by reputation, say, or by having corresponded with him. Nevertheless, he becomes real to me in the fullest sense of the word only when I meet him face to face. Indeed, it may be argued that the other in the face-to-face situation is more real to me than I myself. Of course I "know myself better" than I can ever know him. My subjectivity is accessible to me in a way his can never be, no matter how "close" our relationship. My past is available to me in memory in a fullness with which I can never reconstruct his, however much he may tell me about it. But this "better knowledge" of myself requires reflection. It is not immediately appresented to me. The other, however, is so appresented in the face-to-face situation. "What he is," therefore, is ongoingly available to me. This availability is continuous and prereflective. On the other hand, "What I am" is not so available. To make it available requires that I stop, arrest the continuous spontaneity of my experience, and deliberately turn my attention back upon myself. What is more, such reflection about myself is typically occasioned by the attitude toward me that

the other exhibits. It is typically a "mirror" response to atti-
tudes of the other.

It follows that relations with others in the face-to-face sit-
uation are highly flexible. Put negatively, it is comparatively
difficult to impose rigid patterns upon face-to-face interac-
tion. Whatever patterns are introduced will be continuously
modified through the exceedingly variegated and subtle inter-
change of subjective meanings that goes on. For instance, I
may view the other as someone inherently unfriendly to me
and act toward him within a pattern of "unfriendly relations"
as understood by me. In the face-to-face situation, however,
the other may confront me with attitudes and acts that con-
tradict this pattern, perhaps up to a point where I am led to
abandon the pattern as inapplicable and to view him as
friendly. In other words, the pattern cannot sustain the mas-
sive evidence of the other's subjectivity that is available to
me in the face-to-face situation. By contrast, it is much easier
for me to ignore such evidence as long as I do not encounter
the other face to face. Even in such a relatively "close" rela-
tion as may be maintained by correspondence I can more
successfully dismiss the other's protestations of friendship as
not actually representing his subjective attitude to me, sim-
ply because in correspondence I lack the immediate, con-
tinuous and massively real presence of his expressivity. It is,
to be sure, possible for me to misinterpret the other's mean-
ings even in the face-to-face situation, as it is possible for
him "hypocritically" to hide his meanings. All the same, both
misinterpretation and "hypocrisy" are more difficult to sus-
tain in face-to-face interaction than in less "close" forms of
social relations.

On the other hand, I apprehend the other by means of
typificatory schemes even in the face-to-face situation, al-
though these schemes are more "vulnerable" to his interfer-
ence than in "remoter" forms of interaction. Put differently,
while it is comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns on
face-to-face interaction, even it is patterned from the begin-
ning if it takes place within the routines of everyday life.
(We can leave aside for later consideration cases of interac-
tion between complete strangers who have no common back-
ground of everyday life.) The reality of everyday life contains

typificatory schemes in terms of which others are apprehended and "dealt with" in face-to-face encounters. Thus I apprehend the other as "a man," "a European," "a buyer," "a jovial type," and so on. All these typifications ongoingly affect my interaction with him as, say, I decide to show him a good time on the town before trying to sell him my product. Our face-to-face interaction will be patterned by these typifications as long as they do not become problematic through interference on his part. Thus he may come up with evidence that, although "a man," "a European" and "a buyer," he is also a self-righteous moralist, and that what appeared first as joviality is actually an expression of contempt for Americans in general and American salesmen in particular. At this point, of course, my typificatory scheme will have to be modified, and the evening planned differently in accordance with this modification. Unless thus challenged, though, the typifications will hold until further notice and will determine my actions in the situation.

The typificatory schemes entering into face-to-face situations are, of course, reciprocal. The other also apprehends me in a typified way—as "a man," "an American," "a salesman," "an ingratiating fellow," and so on. The other's typifications are as susceptible to my interference as mine are to his. In other words, the two typificatory schemes enter into an ongoing "negotiation" in the face-to-face situation. In everyday life such "negotiation" is itself likely to be prearranged in a typical manner—as in the typical bargaining process between buyers and salesmen. Thus, most of the time, my encounters with others in everyday life are typical in a double sense—I apprehend the other *as* a type and I interact with him in a situation that is itself typical.

The typifications of social interaction become progressively anonymous the farther away they are from the face-to-face situation. Every typification, of course, entails incipient anonymity. If I typify my friend Henry as a member of category X (say, as an Englishman), I *ipso facto* interpret at least certain aspects of his conduct as resulting from this typification —for instance, his tastes in food are typical of Englishmen, as are his manners, certain of his emotional reactions, and so on. This implies, though, that these characteristics and ac-

tions of my friend Henry appertain to *anyone* in the category of Englishman, that is, I apprehend these aspects of his being in anonymous terms. Nevertheless, as long as my friend Henry is available in the plenitude of expressivity of the face-to-face situation, he will constantly break through my type of anonymous Englishman and manifest himself as a unique and therefore atypical individual—to wit, as my friend Henry. The anonymity of the type is obviously less susceptible to this kind of individualization when face-to-face interaction is a matter of the past (my friend Henry, *the Englishman*, whom I knew when I was a college student), or is of a superficial and transient kind (the Englishman with whom I have a brief conversation on a train), or has never taken place (my business competitors in England).

An important aspect of the experience of others in everyday life is thus the directness or indirectness of such experience. At any given time it is possible to distinguish between consociates with whom I interact in face-to-face situations and others who are mere contemporaries, of whom I have only more or less detailed recollections, or of whom I know merely by hearsay. In face-to-face situations I have direct evidence of my fellowman, of his actions, his attributes, and so on. Not so in the case of contemporaries—of them I have more or less reliable knowledge. Furthermore, I must take account of my fellowmen in face-to-face situations, while I may, but need not, turn my thoughts to mere contemporaries. Anonymity increases as I go from the former to the latter, because the anonymity of the typifications by means of which I apprehend fellowmen in face-to-face situations is constantly "filled in" by the multiplicity of vivid symptoms referring to a concrete human being.

This, of course, is not the whole story. There are obvious differences in my experiences of mere contemporaries. Some I have experienced again and again in face-to-face situations and expect to meet again regularly (my friend Henry); others I *recollect* as concrete human beings from a past meeting (the blonde I passed on the street), but the meeting was brief and, most likely, will not be repeated. Still others I *know of* as concrete human beings, but I can apprehend them only by means of more or less anonymous intersecting typifications

(my British business competitors, the Queen of England). Among the latter one could again distinguish between likely partners in face-to-face situations (my British business competitors), and potential but unlikely partners (the Queen of England).

The degree of anonymity characterizing the experience of others in everyday life depends, however, upon another factor too. I see the newspaper vendor on the street corner as regularly as I see my wife. But he is less important to me and I am not on intimate terms with him. He may remain relatively anonymous to me. The degree of interest and the degree of intimacy may combine to increase or decrease anonymity of experience. They may also influence it independently. I can be on fairly intimate terms with a number of the fellow-members of a tennis club and on very formal terms with my boss. Yet the former, while by no means completely anonymous, may merge into "that bunch at the courts" while the latter stands out as a unique individual. And finally, anonymity may become near-total with certain typifications that are not intended ever to become individualized—such as the "typical reader of the London *Times*." Finally, the "scope" of the typification—and thereby its anonymity—can be further increased by speaking of "British public opinion."

The social reality of everyday life is thus apprehended in a continuum of typifications, which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the "here and now" of the face-to-face situation. At one pole of the continuum are those others with whom I frequently and intensively interact in face-to-face situations—my "inner circle," as it were. At the other pole are highly anonymous abstractions, which by their very nature can never be available in face-to-face interaction. Social structure is the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them. As such, social structure is an essential element of the reality of everyday life.

One further point ought to be made here, though we cannot elaborate it. My relations with others are not limited to consociates and contemporaries. I also relate to predecessors and successors, to those others who have preceded and will follow me in the encompassing history of my society.

Except for those who are past consociates (my dead friend Henry), I relate to my predecessors through highly anonymous typifications—"my immigrant great-grandparents," and even more, "the Founding Fathers." My successors, for understandable reasons, are typified in an even more anonymous manner—"my children's children," or "future generations." These typifications are substantively empty projections, almost completely devoid of individualized content, whereas the typifications of predecessors have at least some such content, albeit of a highly mythical sort. The anonymity of both these sets of typifications, however, does not prevent their entering as elements into the reality of everyday life, sometimes in a very decisive way. After all, I may sacrifice my life in loyalty to the Founding Fathers—or, for that matter, on behalf of future generations.

3. LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended. For instance, a subjective attitude of anger is directly expressed in the face-to-face situation by a variety of bodily indices—facial mien, general stance of the body, specific movements of arms and feet, and so on. These indices are continuously available in the face-to-face situation, which is precisely why it affords me the optimal situation for gaining access to another's subjectivity. The same indices are incapable of surviving beyond the vivid present of the face-to-face situation. Anger, however, can be objectivated by means of a weapon. Say, I have had an altercation with another man, who has given me ample expressive evidence of his anger against me. That night I wake up with a knife embedded in the wall above my bed. The knife *qua* object expresses my adversary's anger. It affords me

access to his subjectivity even though I was sleeping when he threw it and never saw him because he fled after his near-hit. Indeed, if I leave the object where it is, I can look at it again the following morning, and again it expresses to me the anger of the man who threw it. What is more, other men can come and look at it and arrive at the same conclusion. In other words, the knife in my wall has become an objectively available constituent of the reality I share with my adversary and with other men. Presumably, this knife was not produced for the exclusive purpose of being thrown *at me*. But it expresses a subjective intention of violence, whether motivated by anger or by utilitarian considerations, such as killing for food. The weapon *qua* object in the real world continues to express a general intention to commit violence that is recognizable by anyone who knows what a weapon is. The weapon, then, is both a human product and an objectivation of human subjectivity.

The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations; it is only possible because of them. I am constantly surrounded by objects that "proclaim" the subjective intentions of my fellowmen, although I may sometimes have difficulty being quite sure just what it is that a particular object is "proclaiming," especially if it was produced by men whom I have not known well or at all in face-to-face situations. Every ethnologist or archaeologist will readily testify to such difficulties, but the very fact that he *can* overcome them and reconstruct from an artifact the subjective intentions of men whose society may have been extinct for millennia is eloquent proof of the enduring power of human objectivations.

A special but crucially important case of objectivation is signification, that is, the human production of signs. A sign may be distinguished from other objectivations by its explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meanings. To be sure, all objectivations are susceptible of utilization as signs, even though they were not originally produced with this intention. For instance, a weapon may have been originally produced for the purpose of hunting animals, but may then (say, in ceremonial usage) become a sign for aggressiveness and violence in general. But there are certain objectivations originally and explicitly intended to serve as signs. For in-

stance, instead of throwing a knife at me (an act that was presumably intended to kill me, but that might conceivably have been intended merely to signify this possibility), my adversary could have painted a black X-mark on my door, a sign, let us assume, that we are now officially in a state of enmity. Such a sign, which has no purpose beyond indicating the subjective meaning of the one who made it, is also objectively available in the common reality he and I share with other men. I recognize its meaning, as do other men, and indeed it is available to its producer as an objective "reminder" of his original intention in making it. It will be clear from the above that there is a good deal of fluidity between the instrumental and the significatory uses of certain objectivations. The special case of magic, in which there is a very interesting merging of these two uses, need not concern us here.

Signs are clustered in a number of systems. Thus there are systems of gesticulatory signs, of patterned bodily movements, of various sets of material artifacts, and so on. Signs and sign systems are objectivations in the sense of being objectively available beyond the expression of subjective intentions "here and now." This "detachability" from the immediate expressions of subjectivity also pertains to signs that require the mediating presence of the body. Thus performing a dance that signifies aggressive intent is an altogether different thing from snarling or clenching fists in an outburst of anger. The latter acts express my subjectivity "here and now," while the former can be quite detached from this subjectivity—I may not be angry or aggressive at all at this point but merely taking part in the dance because I am paid to do so on behalf of someone else who *is* angry. In other words, the dance can be detached from the subjectivity of the dancer in a way in which the snarling *cannot* from the snarler. Both dancing and snarling are manifestations of bodily expressivity, but only the former has the character of an objectively available sign. Signs and sign systems are all characterized by "detachability," but they can be differentiated in terms of the degree to which they may be detached from face-to-face situations. Thus a dance is evidently less detached than a material artifact signifying the same subjective meaning.

Language, which may be defined here as a system of vocal

signs, is the most important sign system of human society. Its foundation is, of course, in the intrinsic capacity of the human organism for vocal expressivity, but we can begin to speak of language only when vocal expressions have become capable of detachment from the immediate "here and now" of subjective states. It is not yet language if I snarl, grunt, howl, or hiss, although these vocal expressions are capable of becoming linguistic insofar as they are integrated into an objectively available sign system. The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification. Everyday life is, above all, life with and by means of the language I share with my fellowmen. An understanding of language is thus essential for any understanding of the reality of everyday life.

Language has its origins in the face-to-face situation, but can be readily detached from it. This is not only because I can shout in the dark or across a distance, speak on the telephone or via the radio, or convey linguistic signification by means of writing (the latter constituting, as it were, a sign system of the second degree). The detachment of language lies much more basically in its capacity to communicate meanings that are not direct expressions of subjectivity "here and now." It shares this capacity with other sign systems, but its immense variety and complexity make it much more readily detachable from the face-to-face situation than any other (for example, a system of gesticulations). I can speak about innumerable matters that are not present at all in the face-to-face situation, including matters I never have and never will experience directly. In this way, language is capable of becoming the objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and experience, which it can then preserve in time and transmit to following generations.

In the face-to-face situation language possesses an inherent quality of reciprocity that distinguishes it from any other sign system. The ongoing production of vocal signs in conversation can be sensitively synchronized with the ongoing subjective intentions of the conversants. I speak as I think: so does my partner in the conversation. Both of us hear what each says at virtually the same instant, which makes possible a continuous, synchronized, reciprocal access to our two subjectivities,

an intersubjective closeness in the face-to-face situation that no other sign system can duplicate. What is more, I hear *myself* as I speak; my own subjective meanings are made objectively and continuously available to me and *ipso facto* become "more real" to me. Another way of putting this is to recall the previous point about my "better knowledge" of the other as against my knowledge of myself in the face-to-face situation. This apparently paradoxical fact has been previously explained by the massive, continuous and prereflective availability of the other's being in the face-to-face situation, as against the requirement of reflection for the availability of my own. Now, however, as I objectivate my own being by means of language, my own being becomes massively and continuously available to myself at the same time that it is so available to him, and I can spontaneously respond to it without the "interruption" of deliberate reflection. It can, therefore, be said that language makes "more real" my subjectivity not only to my conversation partner but also to myself. This capacity of language to crystallize and stabilize for me my own subjectivity is retained (albeit with modifications) as language is detached from the face-to-face situation. This very important characteristic of language is well caught in the saying that men must talk about themselves until they know themselves.

Language originates in and has its primary reference to everyday life; it refers above all to the reality I experience in wide-awake consciousness, which is dominated by the pragmatic motive (that is, the cluster of meanings directly pertaining to present or future actions) and which I share with others in a taken-for-granted manner. Although language can also be employed to refer to other realities, which will be discussed further in a moment, it even then retains its rootage in the commonsense reality of everyday life. As a sign system, language has the quality of objectivity. I encounter language as a facticity external to myself and it is coercive in its effect on me. Language forces me into its patterns. I cannot use the rules of German syntax when I speak English; I cannot use words invented by my three-year-old son if I want to communicate outside the family; I must take into account prevailing standards of proper speech for various occasions, even

if I would prefer my private "improper" ones. Language provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. Put differently, language is pliantly expansive so as to allow me to objectify a great variety of experiences coming my way in the course of my life. Language also typifies experiences, allowing me to subsume them under broad categories in terms of which they have meaning not only to myself but also to my fellowmen. As it typifies, it also anonymizes experiences, for the typified experience can, in principle, be duplicated by anyone falling into the category in question. For instance, I have a quarrel with my mother-in-law. This concrete and subjectively unique experience is typified linguistically under the category of "mother-in-law trouble." In this typification it makes sense to myself, to others, and, presumably, to my mother-in-law. The same typification, however, entails anonymity. Not only I but *anyone* (more accurately, anyone in the category of son-in-law) can have "mother-in-law trouble." In this way, my biographical experiences are ongoingly subsumed under general orders of meaning that are both objectively and subjectively real.

Because of its capacity to transcend the "here and now," language bridges different zones within the reality of everyday life and integrates them into a meaningful whole. The transcendences have spatial, temporal and social dimensions. Through language I can transcend the gap between my manipulatory zone and that of the other; I can synchronize my biographical time sequence with his; and I can converse with him about individuals and collectivities with whom we are not at present in face-to-face interaction. As a result of these transcendences language is capable of "making present" a variety of objects that are spatially, temporally and socially absent from the "here and now." *Ipso facto* a vast accumulation of experiences and meanings can become objectified in the "here and now." Put simply, through language an entire world can be actualized at any moment. This transcending and integrating power of language is retained when I am not actually conversing with another. Through linguistic objectification, even when "talking to myself" in solitary thought, an entire world can be appresented to me at any moment. As

far as social relations are concerned, language "makes present" for me not only fellowmen who are physically absent at the moment, but fellowmen in the remembered or reconstructed past, as well as fellowmen projected as imaginary figures into the future. All these "presences" can be highly meaningful, of course, in the ongoing reality of everyday life.

Moreover, language is capable of transcending the reality of everyday life altogether. It can refer to experiences pertaining to finite provinces of meaning, and it can span discrete spheres of reality. For instance, I can interpret "the meaning" of a dream by integrating it linguistically within the order of everyday life. Such integration transposes the discrete reality of the dream into the reality of everyday life by making it an enclave within the latter. The dream is now meaningful in terms of the reality of everyday life rather than of its own discrete reality. Enclaves produced by such transposition belong, in a sense, to both spheres of reality. They are "located" in one reality, but "refer" to another.

Any significative theme that thus spans spheres of reality may be defined as a symbol, and the linguistic mode by which such transcendence is achieved may be called symbolic language. On the level of symbolism, then, linguistic signification attains the maximum detachment from the "here and now" of everyday life, and language soars into regions that are not only *de facto* but *a priori* unavailable to everyday experience. Language now constructs immense edifices of symbolic representations that appear to tower over the reality of everyday life like gigantic presences from another world. Religion, philosophy, art, and science are the historically most important symbol systems of this kind. To name these is already to say that, despite the maximal detachment from everyday experience that the construction of these systems requires, they can be of very great importance indeed for the reality of everyday life. Language is capable not only of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted from everyday experience, but also of "bringing back" these symbols and appresenting them as objectively real elements in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and symbolic language become essential constituents of the reality of everyday life and of the com-

monsense apprehension of this reality. I live in a world of signs *and* symbols every day.

Language builds up semantic fields or zones of meaning that are linguistically circumscribed. Vocabulary, grammar and syntax are geared to the organization of these semantic fields. Thus language builds up classification schemes to differentiate objects by "gender" (a quite different matter from sex, of course) or by number; forms to make statements of action as against statements of being; modes of indicating degrees of social intimacy, and so on. For example, in languages that distinguish intimate and formal discourse by means of pronouns (such as *tu* and *vous* in French, or *du* and *Sie* in German) this distinction marks the co-ordinates of a semantic field that could be called the zone of intimacy. Here lies the world of *tutoiement* or of *Bruderschaft*, with a rich collection of meanings that are continually available to me for the ordering of my social experience. Such a semantic field, of course, also exists for the English speaker, though it is more circumscribed linguistically. Or, to take another example, the sum of linguistic objectifications pertaining to my occupation constitutes another semantic field, which meaningfully orders all the routine events I encounter in my daily work. Within the semantic fields thus built up it is possible for both biographical and historical experience to be objectified, retained and accumulated. The accumulation, of course, is selective, with the semantic fields determining what will be retained and what "forgotten" of the total experience of both the individual and the society. By virtue of this accumulation a social stock of knowledge is constituted, which is transmitted from generation to generation and which is available to the individual in everyday life. I live in the commonsense world of everyday life equipped with specific bodies of knowledge. What is more, I know that others share at least part of this knowledge, and they know that I know this. My interaction with others in everyday life is, therefore, constantly affected by our common participation in the available social stock of knowledge.

The social stock of knowledge includes knowledge of my situation and its limits. For instance, I know that I am poor and that, therefore, I cannot expect to live in a fashionable

suburb. This knowledge is, of course, shared both by those who are poor themselves and those who are in a more privileged situation. Participation in the social stock of knowledge thus permits the "location" of individuals in society and the "handling" of them in the appropriate manner. This is not possible for one who does not participate in this knowledge, such as a foreigner, who may not recognize me as poor at all, perhaps because the criteria of poverty are quite different in his society—how can I be poor, when I wear shoes and do not seem to be hungry?

Since everyday life is dominated by the pragmatic motive, recipe knowledge, that is, knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performances, occupies a prominent place in the social stock of knowledge. For example, I use the telephone every day for specific pragmatic purposes of my own. I know how to do this. I also know what to do if my telephone fails to function—which does not mean that I know how to repair it, but that I know whom to call on for assistance. My knowledge of the telephone also includes broader information on the system of telephonic communication—for instance, I know that some people have unlisted numbers, that under special circumstances I can get a simultaneous hook-up with two long-distance parties, that I must figure on the time difference if I want to call up somebody in Hongkong, and so forth. All of this telephonic lore is recipe knowledge since it does not concern anything except what I have to know for my present and possible future pragmatic purposes. I am not interested in *why* the telephone works this way, in the enormous body of scientific and engineering knowledge that makes it possible to construct telephones. Nor am I interested in uses of the telephone that lie outside my purposes, say in combination with short-wave radio for the purpose of marine communication. Similarly, I have recipe knowledge of the workings of human relationships. For example, I know what I must do to apply for a passport. All I am interested in is getting the passport at the end of a certain waiting period. I do not care, and do not know, how my application is processed in government offices, by whom and after what steps approval is given, who puts which stamp in the document. I am not making a study of

government bureaucracy—I just want to go on a vacation abroad. My interest in the hidden workings of the passport-getting procedure will be aroused only if I fail to get my passport in the end. At that point, very much as I call on a telephone-repair expert after my telephone has broken down, I call on an expert in passport-getting—a lawyer, say, or my Congressman, or the American Civil Liberties Union. *Mutatis mutandis*, a large part of the social stock of knowledge consists of recipes for the mastery of routine problems. Typically, I have little interest in going beyond this pragmatically necessary knowledge as long as the problems can indeed be mastered thereby.

The social stock of knowledge differentiates reality by degrees of familiarity. It provides complex and detailed information concerning those sectors of everyday life with which I must frequently deal. It provides much more general and imprecise information on remoter sectors. Thus my knowledge of my own occupation and its world is very rich and specific, while I have only very sketchy knowledge of the occupational worlds of others. The social stock of knowledge further supplies me with the typificatory schemes required for the major routines of everyday life, not only the typifications of others that have been discussed before, but typifications of all sorts of events and experiences, both social and natural. Thus I live in a world of relatives, fellow-workers and recognizable public functionaries. In this world, consequently, I experience family gatherings, professional meetings and encounters with the traffic police. The natural "backdrop" of these events is also typified within the stock of knowledge. My world is structured in terms of routines applying in good or bad weather, in the hayfever season and in situations when a speck of dirt gets caught under my eyelid. "I know what to do" with regard to all these others and all these events within my everyday life. By presenting itself to me as an integrated whole the social stock of knowledge also provides me with the means to integrate discrete elements of my own knowledge. In other words, "what everybody knows" has its own logic, and the same logic can be applied to order various things that I know. For example, I know that my friend Henry is an Englishman, and I know

that he is always very punctual in keeping appointments. Since "everybody knows" that punctuality is an English trait, I can now integrate these two elements of my knowledge of Henry into a typification that is meaningful in terms of the social stock of knowledge.

The validity of my knowledge of everyday life is taken for granted by myself and by others until further notice, that is, until a problem arises that cannot be solved in terms of it. As long as my knowledge works satisfactorily, I am generally ready to suspend doubts about it. In ·certain attitudes detached from everyday reality—telling a joke, at the theater or in church, or engaging in philosophical speculation—I may perhaps doubt elements of it. But these doubts are "not to be taken seriously." For instance, as a businessman I know that it pays to be inconsiderate of others. I may laugh at a joke in which this maxim leads to failure, I may be moved by an actor or a preacher extolling the virtues of consideration, and I may concede in a philosophical mood that all social relations should be governed by the Golden Rule. Having laughed, having been moved and having philosophized, I return to the "serious" world of business, once more recognize the logic of its maxims, and act accordingly. Only when my maxims fail "to deliver the goods" in the world to which they are intended to apply are they likely to become problematic to me "in earnest."

Although the social stock of knowledge appresents the everyday world in an integrated manner, differentiated according to zones of familiarity and remoteness, it leaves the totality of that world opaque. Put differently, the reality of everyday life always appears as a zone of lucidity behind which there is a background of darkness. As some zones of reality are illuminated, others are adumbrated. I cannot know everything there is to know about this reality. Even if, for instance, I am a seemingly all-powerful despot in my family, and know this, I cannot know all the factors that go into the continuing success of my despotism. I know that my orders are always obeyed, but I cannot be sure of all the steps and all the motives that lie between the issuance and the execution of my orders. There are always things that go on "behind my back." This is true *a fortiori* when social

relationships more complex than those of the family are involved—and explains, incidentally, why despots are endemically nervous. My knowledge of everyday life has the quality of an instrument that cuts a path through a forest and, as it does so, projects a narrow cone of light on what lies just ahead and immediately around; on all sides of the path there continues to be darkness. This image pertains even more, of course, to the multiple realities in which everyday life is continually transcended. This latter statement can be paraphrased, poetically if not exhaustively, by saying that the reality of everyday life is overcast by the penumbras of our dreams.

My knowledge of everyday life is structured in terms of relevances. Some of these are determined by immediate pragmatic interests of mine, others by my general situation in society. It is irrelevant to me how my wife goes about cooking my favorite goulash as long as it turns out the way I like it. It is irrelevant to me that the stock of a company is falling, if I do not own such stock; or that Catholics are modernizing their doctrine, if I am an atheist; or that it is now possible to fly non-stop to Africa, if I do not want to go there. However, my relevance structures intersect with the relevance structures of others at many points, as a result of which we have "interesting" things to say to each other. An important element of my knowledge of everyday life is the knowledge of the relevance structures of others. Thus I "know better" than to tell my doctor about my investment problems, my lawyer about my ulcer pains, or my accountant about my quest for religious truth. The basic relevance structures referring to everyday life are presented to me ready-made by the social stock of knowledge itself. I know that "woman talk" is irrelevant to me as a man, that "idle speculation" is irrelevant to me as a man of action, and so forth. Finally, the social stock of knowledge as a whole has its own relevance structure. Thus, in terms of the stock of knowledge objectivated in American society, it is irrelevant to study the movements of the stars to predict the stock market, but it is relevant to study an individual's slips of the tongue to find out about his sex life, and so on. Conversely, in other societies,

astrology may be highly relevant for economics, speech analysis quite irrelevant for erotic curiosity, and so on.

One final point should be made here about the social distribution of knowledge. I encounter knowledge in everyday life as socially distributed, that is, as possessed differently by different individuals and types of individuals. I do not share my knowledge equally with all my fellowmen, and there may be some knowledge that I share with no one. I share my professional expertise with colleagues, but not with my family, and I may share with nobody my knowledge of how to cheat at cards. The social distribution of knowledge of certain elements of everyday reality can become highly complex and even confusing to the outsider. I not only do not possess the knowledge supposedly required to cure me of a physical ailment, I may even lack the knowledge of which one of a bewildering variety of medical specialists claims jurisdiction over what ails me. In such cases, I require not only the advice of experts, but the prior advice of experts on experts. The social distribution of knowledge thus begins with the simple fact that I do not know everything known to my fellowmen, and vice versa, and culminates in exceedingly complex and esoteric systems of expertise. Knowledge of *how* the socially available stock of knowledge is distributed, at least in outline, is an important element of that same stock of knowledge. In everyday life I know, at least roughly, what I can hide from whom, whom I can turn to for information on what I do not know, and generally which types of individuals may be expected to have which types of knowledge.

Notes

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

1. *Cf.* Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Bern, Francke, 1960). This volume of essays, first published in 1925, contains the basic formulation of the sociology of knowledge in an essay entitled "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens," which was originally published a year earlier.

2. *Cf.* Wilhelm Windelband and Heinz Heimsoeth, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1950), pp. 605 ff.

3. *Cf.* Albert Salomon, *In Praise of Enlightenment* (New York, Meridian Books, 1963); Hans Barth, *Wahrheit und Ideologie* (Zurich, Manesse, 1945); Werner Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (Chicago, Free Press of Glencoe, 1958), pp. 46 ff.; Kurt Lenk (ed.), *Ideologie* (Neuwied/Rhein, Luchterhand, 1961), pp. 13 ff.

4. *Pensées* v. 294.

5. *Cf.* Karl Marx, *Die Frühschriften* (Stuttgart, Kröner, 1953). The *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* will be found on pp. 225 ff.

6. On Marx's *Unterbau/Ueberbau* scheme, *cf.* Karl Kautsky, "Verhältnis von Unterbau und Ueberbau," in Iring Fetscher (ed.), *Der Marxismus* (Munich, Piper, 1962), pp. 160 ff.; Antonio Labriola, "Die Vermittlung zwischen Basis und Ueberbau," *ibid.*, pp. 167 ff.; Jean-Yves Calvez, *La pensée de Karl Marx* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1956), pp. 424 ff. The most important twentieth-century reformulation of the problem is that by György Lukács, in his *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (Berlin, 1923), today more readily accessible in the French translation, *Histoire et conscience de classe* (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1960). Lukács' understanding of Marx's concept of dialectics is all the more remarkable as it antedated by almost a decade the rediscovery of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*.

7. The most important works of Nietzsche's for the sociology of knowledge are *The Genealogy of Morals* and *The Will to Power*. For secondary discussions, *cf.* Walter A. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche* (New York, Meridian Books, 1956); Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche* (English translation—New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

8. One of the earliest and most interesting applications of Nietzsche's thought to a sociology of knowledge is Alfred Seidel's in *Bewusstsein als Verhängnis* (Bonn, Cohen, 1927). Seidel, who had been a student of Weber's, tried to combine both Nietzsche and Freud with a radical sociological critique of consciousness.

9. One of the most suggestive discussions of the relationship between historicism and sociology is Carlo Antoni's in *Dallo storicismo alla sociologia* (Florence, 1940). Also, *cf.* H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (New York, Knopf, 1958), pp. 183 ff. The most important work of Wilhelm Dilthey's for our present considerations is *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (Stuttgart, Teubner, 1958).

10. For an excellent discussion of Scheler's conception of the sociology of knowledge, *cf.* Hans-Joachim Lieber, *Wissen und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1952), pp. 55 ff. See also Stark, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

11. For the general development of German sociology during this period, *cf.* Raymond Aron, *La sociologie allemande contemporaine* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950). For important contributions from this period concerning the sociology of knowledge, *cf.* Siegfried Landshut, *Kritik der Soziologie* (Munich, 1929); Hans Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1930); Ernst Grünwald, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens* (Vienna, 1934); Alexander von Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1934). The last-named work, still the most important discussion of Weber's methodology, must be understood against the background of the debate on the sociology of knowledge, then centering on both Scheler's and Mannheim's formulations.

12. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1936); *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1952); *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953); *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956). A compendium of Mannheim's most important writings in the sociology of knowledge, compiled and with a useful introduction by Kurt Wolff, is Karl Mannheim, *Wissenssoziologie* (Neuwied/Rhein, Luchterhand, 1964). For secondary discussions of Mannheim's conception of the sociology of knowledge, *cf.* Jacques J. Maquet, *Sociologie de la connaissance* (Louvain, Nauwelaerts, 1949); Aron, *op. cit.*; Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Chicago, Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 489 ff.; Stark, *op. cit.*; Lieber, *op. cit.*

13. This characterization of the two original formulations of the discipline was made by Lieber, *op. cit.*

14. *Cf.* Merton, *op. cit.,* pp. 439 ff.

15. *Cf.* Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge," *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology* (Louvain, International Sociological Association, 1959), Vol. IV, pp. 25 ff.; "Culture and the Social System," in Parsons et al. (eds.), *Theories of Society* (New York, Free Press, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 963 ff.

16. *Cf.* Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1951), pp. 326 ff.

17. *Cf.* C. Wright Mills, *Power, Politics and People* (New York, Ballantine Books, 1963), pp. 453 ff.

18. *Cf.* Theodor Geiger, *Ideologie und Wahrheit* (Stuttgart, Humboldt, 1953); *Arbeiten zur Soziologie* (Neuwied/Rhein, Luchterhand, 1962), pp. 412 ff.

19. *Cf.* Ernst Topitsch, *Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik* (Vienna, Springer, 1958); *Sozialphilosophie zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft* (Neuwied/Rhein, Luchterhand, 1961). An important influence on Topitsch is the Kelsen school of legal positivism. For the implications of the latter for the sociology of knowledge, *cf.* Hans Kelsen, *Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik* (Neuwied/Rhein, Luchterhand, 1964).

20. *Cf.* Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Kurt Lenk (ed.), *Ideologie;* Norman Birnbaum (ed.), *The Sociological Study of Ideology* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1962).

21. *Cf.* Stark, *op. cit.*

22. Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962), p. 149. Italics ours.

23. *Ibid.,* Vol. II (1964), p. 121.

24. For discussions of the implications of Durkheimian sociology for the sociology of knowledge, *cf.* Gerard L. DeGré, *Society and Ideology* (New York, Columbia University Bookstore, 1943), pp. 54 ff.; Merton, *op. cit.;* Georges Gurvitch, "Problèmes de la sociologie de la connaissance," *Traité de sociologie* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), Vol. II, pp. 103 ff.

25. The closest approach, to our knowledge, of symbolic-interactionism to the problems of the sociology of knowledge may be found in Tamotsu Shibutani, "Reference Groups and Social Control," in Arnold Rose (ed.), *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1962), pp. 128 ff. The failure to make the connection between Meadian social psychology and the sociology of knowledge, on the part of the symbolic-interactionists, is of course related to the limited "diffusion" of the sociology of knowledge in America, but its more important theoretical foundation is to be

sought in the fact that both Mead himself and his later followers did not develop an adequate concept of social structure. Precisely for this reason, we think, is the integration of the Meadian and Durkheimian approaches so very important. It may be observed here that, just as the indifference to the sociology of knowledge on the part of American social psychologists has prevented the latter from relating their perspectives to a macro-sociological theory, so is the total ignorance of Mead a severe theoretical defect of neo-Marxist social thought in Europe today. There is considerable irony in the fact that, of late, neo-Marxist theoreticians have been seeking a liaison with Freudian psychology (which is fundamentally incompatible with the anthropological presuppositions of Marxism), completely oblivious of the existence of a Meadian theory of the dialectic between society and the individual that would be immeasurably more congenial to their own approach. For a recent example of this ironic phenomenon, cf. Georges Lapassade, *L'entrée dans la vie* (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1963), an otherwise highly suggestive book that, as it were, cries out for Mead on every page. The same irony, albeit in a different context of intellectual segregation, pertains to the recent American efforts for a rapprochement between Marxism and Freudianism. One European sociologist who has drawn heavily and successfully upon Mead and the Meadian tradition in the construction of sociological theory is Friedrich Tenbruck. *Cf.* his *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (*Habilitationsschrift*, University of Freiburg, to be published shortly), especially the section entitled "Realität." In a different systematic context than ours, but in a manner quite congenial to our own approach to the Meadian problematic, Tenbruck discusses the social origin of reality and the social-structural bases for the maintenance of reality.

26. Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Chicago, Free Press, 1949), p. v.

27. Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Chicago, Free Press, 1950), p. 14.

28. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 101.

I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN EVERYDAY LIFE

1. This entire section of our treatise is based on Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, now being prepared for publication. In view of this, we have refrained from providing individual references to the places in Schutz's published work where the same problems are discussed. Our argument here is based on Schutz, as developed by Luckmann in the afore-mentioned work, *in toto*. The reader wishing to acquaint himself with Schutz's

work published to date may consult Alfred Schutz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (Vienna, Springer, 1960); *Collected Papers*, Vols. I and II. The reader interested in Schutz's adaptation of the phenomenological method to the analysis of the social world may consult especially his *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 99 ff., and Maurice Natanson (ed.), *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York, Random House, 1963), pp. 183 ff.

II. SOCIETY AS OBJECTIVE REALITY

1. On recent biological work concerning the peculiar position of man in the animal kingdom, *cf.* Jakob von Uexküll, *Bedeutungslehre* (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1958); F. J. J. Buytendijk, *Mensch und Tier* (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1958); Adolf Portmann, *Zoologie und das neue Bild vom Menschen* (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1956). The most important evaluations of these biological perspectives in terms of a philosophical anthropology are those by Helmuth Plessner (*Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch*, 1928 and 1965) and Arnold Gehlen (*Der Mensch, seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt*, 1940 and 1950). It was Gehlen who further developed these perspectives in terms of a sociological theory of institutions (especially in his *Urmensch und Spätkultur*, 1956). For an introduction to the latter, *cf.* Peter L. Berger and Hansfried Kellner, "Arnold Gehlen and the Theory of Institutions," *Social Research* 32: 1, 110 ff. (1965).

2. The term "species-specific environment" is taken from von Uexküll.

3. The anthropological implications of the term "world-openness" were developed by both Plessner and Gehlen.

4. The peculiarity of the human organism as ontogenetically grounded was shown particularly in the investigations of Portmann.

5. The suggestion that the fetal period in man extends through the first year of life was made by Portmann, who called this year the "extrauterine Frühjahr."

6. The term "significant others" is taken from Mead. For Mead's theory of the ontogenesis of the self, *cf.* his *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934). A useful compendium of Mead's writings is Anselm Strauss (ed.), *George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964). For a suggestive secondary discussion, *cf.* Maurice Natanson, *The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead* (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1956).

7. There is a fundamental dichotomy between the conception of man as a self-producing being and a conception of "human nature."

This constitutes a decisive anthropological difference between Marx and any properly sociological perspective on the one hand (especially one that is grounded in Meadian social psychology), and Freud and most non-Freudian psychological perspectives on the other. A clarification of this difference is very important if there is to be any meaningful conversation between the fields of sociology and psychology today. Within sociological theory itself it is possible to distinguish between positions in terms of their closeness to the "sociological" and the "psychological" poles. Vilfredo Pareto probably expresses the most elaborate approach to the "psychological" pole within sociology itself. Incidentally, acceptance or rejection of the "human nature" presupposition also has interesting implications in terms of political ideologies, but this point cannot be developed here.

8. The work of Bronislaw Malinowski, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Clyde Kluckhohn and George Murdock may be cited in this connection.

9. The view here presented on the sexual plasticity of man has an affinity with Freud's conception of the originally unformed character of the libido.

10. This point is explicated in Mead's theory of the social genesis of the self.

11. The term "eccentricity" is taken from Plessner. Similar perspectives can be found in Scheler's later work on philosophical anthropology. Cf. Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (Munich, Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1947).

12. The social character of man's self-production was formulated most sharply by Marx in his critique of Stirner, in *The German Ideology*. Jean-Paul Sartre's development from his earlier existentialism to its later Marxist modification, that is, from *L'être et le néant* to the *Critique de la raison dialectique*, is the most impressive example in contemporary philosophical anthropology of the achievement of this sociologically crucial insight. Sartre's own interest in the "mediations" between the macroscopic socio-historical processes and individual biography would be greatly served, once more, through a consideration of Meadian social psychology.

13. The inextricable connection between man's humanity and his sociality was most sharply formulated by Durkheim, especially in the concluding section of the *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*.

14. In insisting that social order is not based on any "laws of nature" we are not *ipso facto* taking a position on a metaphysical conception of "natural law." Our statement is limited to such facts of nature as are empirically available.

15. It was Durkheim who insisted most strongly on the character *sui generis* of social order, especially in his *Règles de la méthode*

sociologique. The anthropological necessity of externalization was developed by both Hegel and Marx.

16. The biological foundation of externalization and its relationship to the emergence of institutions was developed by Gehlen.

17. The term "stock of knowledge" is taken from Schutz.

18. Gehlen refers to this point in his concepts of *Triebüberschuss* and *Entlastung.*

19. Gehlen refers to this point in his concept of *Hintergrundserfüllung.*

20. The concept of the definition of the situation was formed by W. I. Thomas and developed throughout his sociological work.

21. We are aware of the fact that this concept of institution is broader than the prevailing one in contemporary sociology. We think that such a broader concept is useful for a comprehensive analysis of basic social processes. On social control, *cf.* Friedrich Tenbruck, "Soziale Kontrolle," *Staatslexikon der Goerres-Gesellschaft* (1962), and Heinrich Popitz, "Soziale Normen," *European Journal of Sociology.*

22. The term "taking the role of the other" is taken from Mead. We are here taking Mead's paradigm of socialization and applying it to the broader problem of institutionalization. The argument combines key features of both Mead's and Gehlen's approaches.

23. Simmel's analysis of the expansion from the dyad to the triad is important in this connection. The following argument combines Simmel's and Durkheim's conceptions of the objectivity of social reality.

24. In Durkheim's terms this means that, with the expansion of the dyad into a triad and beyond, the original formations become genuine "social facts," that is, they attain *choséité.*

25. Jean Piaget's concept of infantile "realism" may be compared here.

26. For an analysis of this process in the contemporary family, *cf.* Peter L. Berger and Hansfried Kellner, "Marriage and the Construction of Reality," *Diogenes* 46 (1964), 1 ff.

27. The preceding description closely follows Durkheim's analysis of social reality. This does *not* contradict the Weberian conception of the meaningful character of society. Since social reality always originates in meaningful human actions, it continues to carry meaning even if it is opaque to the individual at a given time. The original may be *reconstructed,* precisely by means of what Weber called *Verstehen.*

28. The term "objectivation" is derived from the Hegelian/Marxian *Versachlichung.*

29. Contemporary American sociology tends towards leaving out

the first moment. Its perspective on society thus tends to be what Marx called a reification (*Verdinglichung*), that is, an undialectical distortion of social reality that obscures the latter's character as an ongoing human production, viewing it instead in thing-like categories appropriate only to the world of nature. That the dehumanization implicit in this is mitigated by values deriving from the larger tradition of the society is, presumably, morally fortunate, but is irrelevant theoretically.

30. Pareto's analysis of the "logic" of institutions is relevant here. A point similar to ours is made by Friedrich Tenbruck, *op. cit.* He too insists that the "strain towards consistency" is rooted in the meaningful character of human action.

31. This, of course, is the fundamental weakness of any functionalistically oriented sociology. For an excellent critique of this, *cf.* the discussion of Bororo society in Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes tropiques* (New York, Atheneum, 1964), pp. 183 ff.

32. The term "recipe knowledge" is taken from Schutz.

33. The term "objectification" is derived from the Hegelian *Vergegenständlichung*.

34. The term "sedimentation" is derived from Edmund Husserl. It was first used by Schutz in a sociological context.

35. This is meant by the term "monothetic acquisition" of Husserl's. It was also used extensively by Schutz.

36. On the "social self" confronting the self in its totality, *cf.* Mead's concept of the "me" with Durkheim's concept of *homo duplex*.

37. Although our argument uses terms foreign to Mead, our conception of the role is very close to his and intends to be an expansion of Meadian role theory in a broader frame of reference, namely one that includes a theory of institutions.

38. The term "representation" is closely related here to the Durkheimian usage, but broader in scope.

39. This process of "binding together" is one of the central concerns of Durkheimian sociology—the integration of society through the fostering of solidarity.

40. The symbolic representations of integration are what Durkheim called "religion."

41. The concept of the social distribution of knowledge is derived from Schutz.

42. The term "mediation" has been used by Sartre, but without the concrete meaning that role theory is capable of giving to it. The term serves well to indicate the general nexus between role theory and the sociology of knowledge.

43. This question could be designated as concerning the "density"

of the institutional order. However, we have been trying to avoid introducing new terms and have decided not to use this term, although it is suggestive.

44. This is what Durkheim referred to as "organic solidarity." Lucien Lévy-Bruhl gives further psychological content to this Durkheimian concept when he speaks of "mystic participation" in primitive societies.

45. Eric Voegelin's concepts of "compactness" and "differentiation" may be compared here. See his *Order and History*, Vol. I (Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1956). Talcott Parsons has spoken of institutional differentiation in various parts of his work.

46. The relationship between the division of labor and institutional differentiation has been analyzed by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Talcott Parsons.

47. It may be said that, despite different interpretations in detail, there is a high degree of consensus on this point throughout the history of sociological theory.

48. The relationship between "pure theory" and economic surplus was first pointed out by Marx.

49. The tendency of institutions to persist was analyzed by Georg Simmel in terms of his concept of "faithfulness." Cf. his *Soziologie* (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1958), pp. 438 ff.

50. This concept of deinstitutionalization is derived from Gehlen.

51. The analysis of deinstitutionalization in the private sphere is a central problem of Gehlen's social psychology of modern society. Cf. his *Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter* (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1957).

52. If one were willing to put up with further neologisms, one could call this the question about the degree of "fusion" or "segmentation" of the institutional order. On the face of it, this question would seem to be identical with the structural-functional concern about the "functional integration" of societies. The latter term, however, presupposes that the "integration" of a society can be determined by an outside observer who investigates the external functioning of the society's institutions. We would contend, on the contrary, that both "functions" and "disfunctions" can only be analyzed by way of the level of meaning. Consequently, "functional integration," if one wants to use this term at all, means the integration of the institutional order by way of various legitimating processes. In other words, *the integration lies not in the institutions but in their legitimation*. This implies, as against the structural-functionalists, that an institutional order cannot adequately be understood as a "system."

53. This problem is related to that of "ideology," which we discuss later in a more narrowly defined context.

54. Weber repeatedly refers to various collectivities as "carriers" (*Träger*) of what we have called here subuniverses of meaning, especially in his comparative sociology of religion. The analysis of this phenomenon is, of course, related to Marx's *Unterbau/Ueberbau* scheme.

55. The pluralistic competition between subuniverses of meaning is one of the most important problems for an empirical sociology of knowledge of contemporary society. We have dealt with this problem elsewhere in our work in the sociology of religion, but see no point in developing an analysis of this in the present treatise.

56. This proposition can be put into Marxian terms by saying that there is a dialectical relationship between substructure (*Unterbau*) and superstructure (*Ueberbau*)—a Marxian insight that has been widely lost in main-line Marxism until very recently. The problem of the possibility of socially detached knowledge has, of course, been a central one for the sociology of knowledge as defined by Scheler and Mannheim. We are not giving it such a central place for reasons inherent in our general theoretical approach. The important point for a theoretical sociology of knowledge is the dialectic between knowledge and its social base. Questions such as Mannheim's concerning the "unattached intelligentsia" are applications of the sociology of knowledge to concrete historical and empirical phenomena. Propositions about these will have to be made on a level of much lesser theoretical generality than interests us here. Questions concerning the autonomy of social-scientific knowledge, on the other hand, should be negotiated in the context of the methodology of the social sciences. This area we have excluded in our definition of the scope of the sociology of knowledge, for theoretical reasons stated in our introduction.

57. This is the phenomenon commonly called "cultural lag" in American sociology since Ogburn. We have avoided this term because of its evolutionistic and implicitly evaluative connotation.

58. Reification (*Verdinglichung*) is an important Marxian concept, particularly in the anthropological considerations of the *Frühschriften*, then developed in terms of the "fetishism of commodities" in *Das Kapital*. For more recent developments of the concept in Marxist theory, cf. György Lukács, *Histoire et conscience de classe*, pp. 109 ff.; Lucien Goldmann, *Recherches dialectiques* (Paris, Gallimard, 1959), pp. 64 ff.; Joseph Gabel, *La fausse conscience* (Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1962), and *Formen der Entfremdung* (Frankfurt, Fischer, 1964). For an extensive discussion of the applicability of the concept within a non-doctrinaire sociology of knowledge, cf. Peter L. Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," *History and Theory* IV: 2, 198 ff. (1965).

In the Marxian frame of reference the concept of reification is closely related to that of alienation (*Entfremdung*). The latter concept has been confused in recent sociological writing with phenomena ranging from *anomie* to neurosis, almost beyond the point of terminological retrieval. In any case, we have felt that this is not the place to attempt such a retrieval and have, therefore, avoided the use of the concept.

59. Recent French critics of Durkheimian sociology, such as Jules Monnerot (*Les faits sociaux ne sont pas des choses*, 1946) and Armand Cuvillier ("Durkheim et Marx," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 1948), have accused it of a reified view of social reality. In other words, they have argued that Durkheim's *choséité* is *ipso facto* a reification. Whatever one may say about this in terms of Durkheim exegesis, it is possible in principle to assert that "social facts are things," and to intend thereby no more than the objectivity of social facts *as human products*. The theoretical key to the question is the distinction between objectivation and reification.

60. Compare here Sartre's concept of the "practico-inert," in *Critique de la raison dialectique*.

61. For this reason Marx called reifying consciousness a *false* consciousness. This concept may be related to Sartre's "bad faith" (*mauvaise foi*).

62. The work of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Jean Piaget may be taken as basic for an understanding of protoreification, both phylo- and ontogenetically. Also, *cf.* Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La pensée sauvage* (Paris, Plon, 1962).

63. On the parallelism between "here below" and "up above," *cf.* Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History* (New York, Harper, 1959). A similar point is made by Voegelin, *op. cit.*, in his discussion of "cosmological civilizations."

64. On the reification of identity, compare Sartre's analysis of anti-Semitism.

65. On conditions for dereification, *cf.* Berger and Pullberg, *loc. cit.*

66. The term "legitimation" is derived from Weber, where it is developed particularly in the context of his political sociology. We have given it a much broader use here.

67. On legitimations as "explanations," compare Pareto's analysis of "derivations."

68. Both Marx and Pareto were aware of the possible autonomy of what we have called legitimations ("ideology" in Marx, "derivations" in Pareto).

69. Our concept of "symbolic universe" is very close to Durkheim's "religion." Schutz's analysis of "finite provinces of meaning"

and their relationship to each other, and Sartre's concept of "total-ization," have been very relevant for our argument at this point.

70. The term "marginal situation" (*Grenzsituation*) was coined by Karl Jaspers. We are using the term in a manner quite different from Jaspers'.

71. Our argument here is influenced by Durkheim's analysis of *anomie*. We are more interested, though, in the *nomic* rather than the *anomic* processes in society.

72. The paramount status of everyday reality was analyzed by Schutz. *Cf.* especially the article "On Multiple Realities," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 207 ff.

73. The precariousness of subjective identity is already implied in Mead's analysis of the genesis of the self. For developments of this analysis, *cf.* Anselm Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday-Anchor, 1959).

74. Heidegger gives the most elaborate analysis in recent philoso-phy of death as the marginal situation par excellence. Schutz's con-cept of the "fundamental anxiety" refers to the same phenomenon. Malinowski's analysis of the social function of funerary ceremonial-ism is also relevant at this point.

75. The use of certain perspectives on "anxiety" (*Angst*) devel-oped by existential philosophy makes it possible to place Durkheim's analysis of *anomie* in a broader anthropological frame of reference.

76. *Cf.* Lévi-Strauss, *op. cit.*

77. On collective memory, *cf.* Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1952). Halbwachs also developed his sociological theory of memory in *La mémoire collective* (1950) and in *La topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre Sainte* (1941).

78. The concepts of "predecessors" and "successors" are derived from Schutz.

79. The conception of the transcending character of society was especially developed by Durkheim.

80. The conception of "projection" was first developed by Feuer-bach, then, albeit in greatly different directions, by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.

81. Compare again Weber's concept of "carrier" (*Träger*).

82. The analyses of "culture contact" in contemporary American cultural anthropology are relevant here.

83. Compare the concept of "culture shock" in contemporary American cultural anthropology.

84. Marx developed in considerable detail the relationship be-tween material power and "conceptual success." *Cf.* the well-known

formulation of this in *The German Ideology:* "Die Gedanken der herrschenden Klasse sind in jeder Epoche die herrschenden Gedanken" (*Frühschriften*, Kröner edition, p. 373).

85. Pareto comes closest to the writing of a history of thought in sociological terms, which makes Pareto important for the sociology of knowledge regardless of reservations one may have about his theoretical frame of reference. *Cf.* Brigitte Berger, *Vilfredo Pareto and the Sociology of Knowledge* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1964).

86. This may be reminiscent of Auguste Comte's "law of the three stages." We cannot accept this, of course, but it may still be useful in suggesting that consciousness develops in historically recognizable stages, though they cannot be conceived of in Comte's manner. Our own understanding of this is closer to the Hegelian/Marxian approach to the historicity of human thought.

87. Both Lévy-Bruhl and Piaget suggest that mythology constitutes a necessary stage in the development of thought. For a suggestive discussion of the biological roots of mythological/magical thought, *cf.* Arnold Gehlen, *Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie* (Neuwied/Rhein, Luchterhand, 1963), pp. 79 ff.

88. Our conception of mythology here is influenced by the work of Gerardus van der Leeuw, Mircea Eliade and Rudolf Bultmann.

89. On the continuity between social and cosmic orders in mythological consciousness, compare again the work of Eliade and Voegelin.

90. It will be clear from our theoretical presuppositions that we cannot here go in any detail into the questions of the "sociology of intellectuals." In addition to Mannheim's important work in this area (to be found especially in *Ideology and Utopia* and *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*), *cf.* Florian Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1940); Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 1949); Raymond Aron, *L'opium des intellectuels* (Paris, 1955); George B. de Huszar (ed.), *The Intellectuals* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

91. On ultimate legitimations strengthening institutional "inertia" (Simmel's "faithfulness"), compare both Durkheim and Pareto.

92. It is precisely at this point that any functionalist interpretation of institutions is weakest, tending to look for practicalities that are not in fact existing.

93. On the Brahman/Kshatriya conflict, compare Weber's work on the sociology of religion in India.

94. On the social validation of propositions that are hard to

validate empirically, *cf.* Leon Festinger, A *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson and Co., 1957).

95. The term "affinity" (*Wahlverwandschaft*) is derived from Scheler and Weber.

96. On monopolistic definitions of reality in primitive and archaic societies, compare both Durkheim and Voegelin.

97. The work of Paul Radin suggests that skepticism is possible even in such monopolistic situations.

98. The term "guest peoples" (*Gastvölker*) is derived from Weber.

99. On the affinity between politically conservative forces and religious monopolies ("churches"), compare Weber's analysis of Hierocracy.

100. The term "ideology" has been used in so many different senses that one might despair of using it in any precise manner at all. We have decided to retain it, in a narrowly defined sense, because it is useful in the latter and preferable to a neologism. There is no point here in discussing the transformations of the term in the history of both Marxism and of the sociology of knowledge. For a useful overview, *cf.* Kurt Lenk (ed.), *Ideologie.*

101. On the relationship of Christianity to bourgeois ideology, see both Marx and Veblen. A useful overview of the former's treatment of religion may be obtained from the anthology *Marx and Engels on Religion* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957).

102. *Cf.* Thomas Luckmann, *Das Problem der Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft* (Freiburg, Rombach, 1963).

103. Our conception of the intellectual as the "unwanted expert" is not very different from Mannheim's insistence on the marginality of the intellectual. In a definition of the intellectual that will be sociologically useful it is important, we think, to set off this type clearly from the "man of knowledge" in general.

104. On the marginality of intellectuals, compare Simmel's analysis of the "objectivity" of the stranger and Veblen's of the intellectual role of the Jews.

105. *Cf.* Peter L. Berger, "The Sociological Study of Sectarianism," *Social Research*, Winter 1954, 467 ff.

106. Compare Mannheim's analysis of revolutionary intellectuals. For the Russian prototype of the latter, *cf.* E. Lampert, *Studies in Rebellion* (New York, Praeger, 1957).

107. The transformation of revolutionary intellectuals into legitimators of the *status quo* can be studied in practically "pure" form in the development of Russian Communism. For a sharp critique of this process from a Marxist viewpoint, *cf.* Leszek Kolakowski, *Der Mensch ohne Alternative* (Munich, 1960).

III. SOCIETY AS SUBJECTIVE REALITY

1. Our conception of "understanding the other" is derived from both Weber and Schutz.

2. Our definitions of socialization and its two subtypes closely follow current usage in the social sciences. We have only adapted the wording to conform to our overall theoretical framework.

3. Our description here, of course, leans heavily on the Meadian theory of socialization.

4. The concept of "mediation" is derived from Sartre, who lacks, however, an adequate theory of socialization.

5. The affective dimension of early learning has been especially emphasized by Freudian child psychology, although there are various findings of behavioristic learning theory that would tend to confirm this. We do not imply acceptance of the theoretical presuppositions of either psychological school in our argument here.

6. Our conception of the reflected character of the self is derived from both Cooley and Mead. Its roots may be found in the analysis of the "social self" by William James (*Principles of Psychology*).

7. Although this could not be developed here, enough may have been said to indicate the possibility of a genuinely dialectical social psychology. The latter would be equally important for philosophical anthropology as for sociology. As far as the latter is concerned, such a social psychology (fundamentally Meadian in orientation, but with the addition of important elements from other streams of social-scientific thought) would make it unnecessary to seek theoretically untenable alliances with either Freudian or behavioristic psychologism.

8. On nomenclature, *cf.* Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La pensée sauvage*, pp. 253 ff.

9. The concept of the "generalized other" is used here in a fully Meadian sense.

10. Compare Georg Simmel on the self-apprehension of man as both inside and outside society. Plessner's concept of "eccentricity" is again relevant here.

11. Compare Piaget on the massive reality of the child's world.

12. Compare Lévy-Bruhl on the phylogenetic analogue to Piaget's infantile "realism."

13. *Cf.* Philippe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood* (New York, Knopf, 1962).

14. Compare here the cultural-anthropological analyses of "rites of passage" connected with puberty.

15. The concept of "role distance" is developed by Erving Goffman, particularly in *Asylums* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday-

Anchor, 1961). Our analysis suggests that such distance is *only* possible with regard to realities internalized in secondary socialization. If it extends to the realities internalized in primary socialization, we are in the domain of what American psychiatry calls "psychopathy," which implies a deficient formation of identity. A very interesting further point suggested by our analysis concerns the structural limits within which a "Goffmanian model" of social interaction may be viable—to wit, societies so structured that decisive elements of ob-jectivated reality are internalized in secondary socialization processes. This consideration, incidentally, should make us careful not to equate Goffman's "model" (which is very useful, let it be added, for the analysis of important features of modern industrial society) with a "dramatic model" *tout court*. There have been other dramas, after all, than that of the contemporary organization man bent on "impression management."

16. The studies in the sociology of occupations, as developed particularly by Everett Hughes, offer interesting material on this point.

17. *Cf.* Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied* (Chicago, Free Press, 1949), pp. 233 ff.

18. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, in *Character and Social Structure* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1953), suggest the term "intimate others" for significant others engaged in reality-maintenance in later life. We prefer not to use this term because of its similarity to that of *Intimsphäre*, which has been employed a lot in recent German-speaking sociology and which has a considerably different connotation.

19. Compare Goffman again on this point, as well as David Riesman.

20. The concepts of "primary group" and "secondary group" are derived from Cooley. We are following current usage in American sociology here.

21. On the concept of the "conversational apparatus," *cf.* Peter L. Berger and Hansfried Kellner, "Marriage and the Construction of Reality," *Diogenes* 46 (1964), 1 ff. Friedrich Tenbruck (*op. cit.*) discusses in some detail the function of communicative networks in maintaining common realities.

22. On correspondence, *cf.* Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 287 ff.

23. The concept of "reference group" is relevant in this connection. Compare Merton's analysis of this, in his *Social Theory and Social Structure*.

24. *Cf.* Peter L. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday-Anchor, 1963), pp. 54 ff.

25. The psychoanalytic concept of "transference" refers precisely to this phenomenon. What the psychoanalysts who use it do not

understand, of course, is that the phenomenon can be found in *any* process of re-socialization with its resultant identification with the significant others who are in charge of it, so that no conclusions can be drawn from it concerning the cognitive validity of the "insights" occurring in the psychoanalytic situation.

26. This is what Durkheim referred to in his analysis of the inevitably social character of religion. We would not use, however, his term "church" for the "moral community" of religion, because it is appropriate only to a historically specific case in the institutionalization of religion.

27. The studies of Chinese Communist "brainwashing" techniques are highly revealing of the basic patterns of alternation. *Cf.*, for instance, Edward Hunter, *Brainwashing in Red China* (New York, Vanguard Press, 1951). Goffman, in his *Asylums*, comes close to showing the procedural parallel to group psychotherapy in America.

28. Again, compare Festinger for the avoidance of discrepant definitions of reality.

29. *Cf.* Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger, "Social Mobility and Personal Identity," *European Journal of Sociology* V, 331 ff. (1964).

30. Riesman's concept of "other-direction" and Merton's of "anticipatory socialization" are relevant at this point.

31. *Cf.* the essays on medical sociology by Eliot Freidson, Theodor J. Litman and Julius A. Roth in Arnold Rose (ed.), *Human Behavior and Social Processes*.

32. Our argument implies the necessity of a macro-sociological background for analyses of internalization, that is, of an understanding of the *social structure* within which internalization occurs. American social psychology today is greatly weakened by the fact that such a background is widely lacking.

33. *Cf.* Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.* Also *cf.* Tenbruck, *op. cit.*, who assigns a prominent place to the structural bases of personality in his typology of primitive, traditional and modern societies.

34. This has the important implication that most psychological models, including those of contemporary scientific psychology, have limited socio-historical applicability. It further implies that a sociological psychology will at the same time have to be a *historical psychology*.

35. *Cf.* Erving Goffman, *Stigma* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963). Also, *cf.* A. Kardiner and L. Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression* (New York, Norton, 1951).

36. *Cf.* Donald W. Cory, *The Homosexual in America* (New York, Greenberg, 1951).

37. We would stress here once more the social-structural condi-

tions for the applicability of a "Goffmanian model" of analysis.

38. Helmut Schelsky has coined the suggestive term "permanent reflectiveness" (*Dauerreflektion*) for the psychological cognate of the contemporary "market of worlds" ("Ist die Dauerreflektion institution-alisierbar?", *Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik*, 1957). The theoretical background of Schelsky's argument is Gehlen's general theory of "subjectivization" in modern society. It was developed further in terms of the sociology of contemporary religion by Luckmann, *op. cit.*

39. *Cf.* Luckmann and Berger, *loc. cit.*

40. It is inadvisable to speak of "collective identity" because of the danger of false (and reifying) hypostatization. The *exemplum horribile* of such hypostatization is the German "Hegelian" sociology of the 1920s and 1930s (such as the work of Othmar Spann). The danger is present in greater or lesser degree in various works of the Durkheim school and the "culture and personality" school in American cultural anthropology.

41. What is implied here, of course, is a sociological critique of the Freudian "reality principle."

42. *Cf.* Peter L. Berger, "Towards a Sociological Understanding of Psychoanalysis," *Social Research*, Spring 1965, 26 ff.

43. *Cf. ibid.*

44. The dialectic between nature and society here discussed is in no way to be equated with the "dialectic of nature," as developed by Engels and later Marxism. The former underlines that man's relationship to his own body (as to nature in general) is itself a specifically human one. The latter, on the contrary, projects specifically human phenomena into non-human nature and then proceeds to theoretically dehumanize man by looking upon him as but the object of natural forces or laws of nature.

45. For this possibility of a discipline of "sociosomatics," *cf.* Georg Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 483 ff. (the essay on the "sociology of the senses"); Marcel Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 365 ff. (the essay on the "techniques of the body"); Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1959). The sociological analysis of sexuality would probably provide the richest empirical material for such a discipline.

46. This was understood very well in Freud's conception of socialization. It was greatly underestimated in the functionalist adaptations of Freud, from Malinowski on.

47. Compare here Henri Bergson (especially his theory of *durée*), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, and Jean Piaget.

48. Compare here both Durkheim and Plessner, as well as Freud.